Diffusion model of multi-agent collaborative behavior in public crisis governance network based on complex network evolutionary game

• Published in: R.A.I.R.O. Recherche opérationnelle Vol. 58; no. 4; pp. 2797 - 2815
• Main Authors: Shan, Shao-Nan, Zhang, Zi-Cheng, Wang, Chun-Juan, Han, Guo-Qiang
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Paris EDP Sciences 01.07.2024
• Subjects: Behavior; Breach of contract; Collaboration; Decision making; Diffusion; Diffusion rate; Game theory; Group dynamics; Multiagent systems
• ISSN: 0399-0559; 2804-7303; 1290-3868
• DOI: 10.1051/ro/2024094

In order to explore the phenomenon of diffusion of group decision making formed by the emergence of decision-making behaviors of governance agents in public crisis governance systems, this research uses a complex network evolutionary game approach, considers BA scale-free networks as network vectors of public crisis governance systems, and develops a diffusion model of collaborative governance decision making behaviors. Simulation experiments are also conducted to show the macro-level impact of micro-subjects’ decision-making behavior on group “Emergence-Diffusion”. The results of this study show that the cost of collaborative governance has the most significant effect on the depth and breadth of the spread of collaborative behavior in governance networks. The size of the network determines the speed of network diffusion. The smaller the network size, the more sensitive it is to the spillover benefits of collaborative governance, and the larger the network size, the more sensitive it is to the penalties of non-compliance. The findings of the study have implications for the collaborative behavior of multiple agents in public crisis governance. The main findings are that (1) in order to ensure the stability of the collaborative governance system, decision making options should be selected according to the size of the network. (2) A reasonable penalty mechanism for breach of contract should be set up to avoid the phenomenon of “free-riding” in collaborative governance. (3) Reasonable allocation of collaboration benefits and maintenance of cooperative relationships between nodes in the neighborhood. (4) External regulators should ensure that information in the network is disseminated without barriers and reduce the phenomenon of information asymmetry.