A Cooperation Scheme in Multistage Game of Renewable Resource Extraction with Asymmetric Players

We derive a non-cooperative and cooperative strategies and state trajectories for a finite-horizon multistage game of renewable resource extraction with asymmetric players. Assuming transferable utility we extend the subgame perfect core concept introduced for extensive-form games to the class of n-...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inMathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research Vol. 13367; pp. 235 - 249
Main Authors Kuzyutin, Denis, Skorodumova, Yulia, Smirnova, Nadezhda
Format Book Chapter
LanguageEnglish
Published Switzerland Springer International Publishing AG 2022
Springer International Publishing
SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
Subjects
Cooperative solution
Fishery-management model
Multistage game
Payoff distribution procedure
Renewable resource extraction
Subgame-perfect equilibrium
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Summary:We derive a non-cooperative and cooperative strategies and state trajectories for a finite-horizon multistage game of renewable resource extraction with asymmetric players. Assuming transferable utility we extend the subgame perfect core concept introduced for extensive-form games to the class of n-person multistage games and specify an algorithm for choosing a unique payoff distribution procedure from the core in a two-player game. This quasi proportional payment schedule satisfies several good properties and could be applied to implement a cooperative solution based on the maximization of the relative benefit from cooperation (or the value of cooperation). We provide a numerical example to demonstrate the properties of the obtained solutions and the algorithm implementation.
Bibliography:The reported study was funded by RFBR and DFG, project number 21-51-12007.
ISBN:9783031096068
3031096061
ISSN:0302-9743
1611-3349
DOI:10.1007/978-3-031-09607-5_17