The Dilemma of Realistic Utopia: On the Conception of “Peoples” in Rawls’s Theory of International Justice

• Published in: Advanced space law (Online) Vol. 13; pp. 64 - 74
• Main Author: Tan, Yusheng
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: International Society of Philosophy and Cosmology (ISPC) 01.07.2024
• Subjects: international justice; law of peoples; peoples; rawls
• ISSN: 2663-3655; 2663-3663
• DOI: 10.29202/asl/13/6

Rawls formulates an international theory of justice with the name The Law of Peoples based on the conception of Peoples endowed with a moral nature. “Peoples” are not equivalent to states in the general sense, but states whose exercise of political power has legitimacy and, therefore, has membership in the society of all peoples. The legitimacy manifests itself in the fact that peoples, as members of the society of peoples, must be reasonable and rational, and in particular, rationality must be restricted by the reasonableness. For Rawls, the willingness to give other peoples a proper respect in a reasonable sense is an essential part of the idea of peoples. However, the tolerance conception of the Law of Peoples centered on liberal peoples and the attitude of liberal peoples towards “outlaw states” and “burdened societies” have betrayed the idea of reasonableness and reciprocity. Although Rawls highlights the concept of “realistic utopia” in the hope that the Law of Peoples is reasonable and necessary, featuring liberal peoples as cores, putting decent hierarchical peoples, outlaw states and burdened societies in an inferior position, The Law of Peoples will be eventually in a dilemma for lack of justice and practicability.