Worrall zu Theorienunterbestimmtheit und Strukturenrealismus: Wirklich kein Problem?

• Published in: KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Vol. 32; no. 1; pp. 27 - 52
• Main Author: Leerhoff, Holger
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: De Gruyter 01.01.2018
• Subjects: non-empirical criteria; realism; structural realism; underdetermination
• ISSN: 1019-8288; 2750-977X
• DOI: 10.1515/krt-2018-320103

In the debate of scientific realism, the argument from underdeter- mination of theories by evidence is put forward by the antirealist side. According to this argument, for any scientific theory rival theories can be found which are equally well supported by the evidence but incompatible with the original theory. Structural realism is a form of realism that limits the realistic belief in the existence of the entities and structures talked about in scientific theories: Only the structures of reality are relevant in an epistemic sense and responsible for the truth and falsehood of theories. In the light of the antirealistic arguments, structural realism is supposed to have clear advantages over other varieties of scientific realism. In particular, Worrall ([21]) argues that structural realism is immune against the argument from underdetermination. I will sketch Worrall's line of argument in a more systematic manner and conclude that it is based on some problematic preconditions