The Anticipated Past in Historical Inquiry

In this paper I argue that, from a pragmatist point of view, to know the past means to anticipate it. Accordingly, historical inquiry is directed towards the future, namely the future of the past as known. I develop this argument in three steps: (I.) Starting with A. O. Lovejoy’s criticism of Dewey’...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEuropean journal of pragmatism and American philosophy
Main Author Niklas, Stefan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Associazione Pragma 08.03.2017
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Summary:In this paper I argue that, from a pragmatist point of view, to know the past means to anticipate it. Accordingly, historical inquiry is directed towards the future, namely the future of the past as known. I develop this argument in three steps: (I.) Starting with A. O. Lovejoy’s criticism of Dewey’s anticipatory theory of knowledge I defend the basic claim that all knowledge, including knowledge of the past, is anticipatory (i.e. directed at future consequences). Lovejoy’s criticism shows that Dewey’s statements invite misunderstandings, which have to be removed. (II.) I then turn to C. I. Lewis’ enhanced outline of a pragmatist theory of knowledge. Lewis provides epistemological arguments regarding the structural features of knowledge of the past and argues knowledge that is gained by the past’s present effects. (III.) Finally, I turn to a notable essay by E. Wind in which he stresses the intrusive and future-oriented character of historical inquiry: Documents are used as instruments for intruding into the past, asking how the past will be understood in the light of new or reconsidered evidence. This process involves anticipating the effects that a different past will have on those affected by the history in question.
ISSN:2036-4091
DOI:10.4000/ejpap.630