Supposition Theory and Porretan Theology: Summa Zwettlensis and Dialogus Ratii et Everardi

Abstract The article investigates how the problem of (linguistic) reference is treated in the theology of two pupils of Gilbert of Poitiers by means of suppo* terms (supponere; suppositus,-a,-um; suppositio). Supposition is for Gilbert an action performed by a speaker, not a property of terms, and h...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inVivarium Vol. 51; no. 1-4; pp. 119 - 144
Main Author Valente, Luisa
Format Journal Article Conference Proceeding
LanguageEnglish
Published Netherlands Brill 2013
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

Loading…
More Information
Summary:Abstract The article investigates how the problem of (linguistic) reference is treated in the theology of two pupils of Gilbert of Poitiers by means of suppo* terms (supponere; suppositus,-a,-um; suppositio). Supposition is for Gilbert an action performed by a speaker, not a property of terms, and he considers language as a system for communication between human beings: key notions are the 'sense in the author's mind' and the 'interpreter's understanding'. In contrast, the two Porretans tend to objectify language as a formal system of terms. Suppositio becomes in the Summa Zwettlensis the name itself as subject term in a proposition, and is divided into many kinds; formal rules are described which govern the influence of the predicate on the subject term's denotation. In Everard of Ypres' Dialogus Ratii et Everardi, supponere is a function (officium) of the name, and 'human is a species of individuals' is, as in some logical treatises and differently from Gilbert, a case of rhetorical transfer.
Bibliography:ark:/67375/JKT-PZVC35C7-B
href:15685349_051_01-04_S08_text.pdf
istex:2E48FBAA5875943523F8DA395D75C85275FF99DB
ISSN:0042-7543
1568-5349
0042-7543
DOI:10.1163/15685349-12341244