Defending the impairment argument

Kyle van Oosterum and Emma Curran have recently argued that the impairment argument against abortion is weak and accomplishes little. They also claim that impairment fails to explain what makes giving a child fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) immoral, which is an important premise of the argument. Here,...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of medical ethics Vol. 50; no. 5; p. 342
Main Author Blackshaw, Bruce Philip
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published England BMJ Publishing Group LTD 01.05.2024
Subjects
Abortion
Abortion, Induced - ethics
Alcohol
Asymmetry
Beneficence
Birth defects
Dissent and Disputes
Female
Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders
Fetuses
Humans
Medical ethics
Pregnancy
Future child disability
Fetus
Abortion - Induced
Personhood
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Summary:Kyle van Oosterum and Emma Curran have recently argued that the impairment argument against abortion is weak and accomplishes little. They also claim that impairment fails to explain what makes giving a child fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) immoral, which is an important premise of the argument. Here, I explain that the impairment argument is not as weak as they believe. Further, I argue that impairment offers a superior explanation for what makes giving a child FAS immoral than their proposal based on creative beneficence.
ISSN:0306-6800
1473-4257
DOI:10.1136/jme-2023-109416