Optimal bailout strategies resulting from the drift controlled supercooled Stefan problem
We consider the problem faced by a central bank which bails out distressed financial institutions that pose systemic risk to the banking sector. In a structural default model with mutual obligations, the central agent seeks to inject a minimum amount of cash in order to limit defaults to a given pro...
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Main Authors | , , |
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Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
02.11.2021
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | We consider the problem faced by a central bank which bails out distressed
financial institutions that pose systemic risk to the banking sector. In a
structural default model with mutual obligations, the central agent seeks to
inject a minimum amount of cash in order to limit defaults to a given
proportion of entities. We prove that the value of the central agent's control
problem converges as the number of defaultable institutions goes to infinity,
and that it satisfies a drift controlled version of the supercooled Stefan
problem. We compute optimal strategies in feedback form by solving numerically
a regularized version of the corresponding mean field control problem using a
policy gradient method. Our simulations show that the central agent's optimal
strategy is to subsidise banks whose equity values lie in a non-trivial
time-dependent region. |
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DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.2111.01783 |