On Cyber Risk Management of Blockchain Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach
Open-access blockchains based on proof-of-work protocols have gained tremendous popularity for their capabilities of providing decentralized tamper-proof ledgers and platforms for data-driven autonomous organization. Nevertheless, the proof-of-work based consensus protocols are vulnerable to cyber-a...
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Main Authors | , , , , , |
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Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
27.04.2018
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Open-access blockchains based on proof-of-work protocols have gained
tremendous popularity for their capabilities of providing decentralized
tamper-proof ledgers and platforms for data-driven autonomous organization.
Nevertheless, the proof-of-work based consensus protocols are vulnerable to
cyber-attacks such as double-spending. In this paper, we propose a novel
approach of cyber risk management for blockchain-based service. In particular,
we adopt the cyber-insurance as an economic tool for neutralizing cyber risks
due to attacks in blockchain networks. We consider a blockchain service market,
which is composed of the infrastructure provider, the blockchain provider, the
cyber-insurer, and the users. The blockchain provider purchases from the
infrastructure provider, e.g., a cloud, the computing resources to maintain the
blockchain consensus, and then offers blockchain services to the users. The
blockchain provider strategizes its investment in the infrastructure and the
service price charged to the users, in order to improve the security of the
blockchain and thus optimize its profit. Meanwhile, the blockchain provider
also purchases a cyber-insurance from the cyber-insurer to protect itself from
the potential damage due to the attacks. In return, the cyber-insurer adjusts
the insurance premium according to the perceived risk level of the blockchain
service. Based on the assumption of rationality for the market entities, we
model the interaction among the blockchain provider, the users, and the
cyber-insurer as a two-level Stackelberg game. Namely, the blockchain provider
and the cyber-insurer lead to set their pricing/investment strategies, and then
the users follow to determine their demand of the blockchain service.
Specifically, we consider the scenario of double-spending attacks and provide a
series of analytical results about the Stackelberg equilibrium in the market
game. |
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DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.1804.10412 |