Sub-committee Approval Voting and Generalised Justified Representation Axioms
Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner voting, multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and public decision making. We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting (SCV) that simultaneously generalizes these settings. We the...
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Main Authors | , |
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Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
16.11.2017
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner
voting, multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and
public decision making. We study a general model of social choice called
Sub-Committee Voting (SCV) that simultaneously generalizes these settings. We
then focus on sub-committee voting with approvals and propose extensions of the
justified representation axioms that have been considered for proportional
representation in approval-based committee voting. We study the properties and
relations of these axioms. For each of the axioms, we analyse whether a
representative committee exists and also examine the complexity of computing
and verifying such a committee. |
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DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.1711.06030 |