Sub-committee Approval Voting and Generalised Justified Representation Axioms

Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner voting, multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and public decision making. We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting (SCV) that simultaneously generalizes these settings. We the...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors Aziz, Haris, Lee, Barton E
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 16.11.2017
Subjects
Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence
Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
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Summary:Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner voting, multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and public decision making. We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting (SCV) that simultaneously generalizes these settings. We then focus on sub-committee voting with approvals and propose extensions of the justified representation axioms that have been considered for proportional representation in approval-based committee voting. We study the properties and relations of these axioms. For each of the axioms, we analyse whether a representative committee exists and also examine the complexity of computing and verifying such a committee.
DOI:10.48550/arxiv.1711.06030