Nurgle: Exacerbating Resource Consumption in Blockchain State Storage via MPT Manipulation

• Published in: arXiv.org
• Main Authors: He, Zheyuan, Li, Zihao, Ao Qiao, Luo, Xiapu, Zhang, Xiaosong, Chen, Ting, Song, Shuwei, Liu, Dijun, Niu, Weina
• Format: Paper Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Ithaca Cornell University Library, arXiv.org 15.06.2024
• Subjects: Blockchain; Computer Science - Cryptography and Security; Cybersecurity; Denial of service attacks; Digital currencies; Performance degradation
• ISSN: 2331-8422
• DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2406.10687

Blockchains, with intricate architectures, encompass various components, e.g., consensus network, smart contracts, decentralized applications, and auxiliary services. While offering numerous advantages, these components expose various attack surfaces, leading to severe threats to blockchains. In this study, we unveil a novel attack surface, i.e., the state storage, in blockchains. The state storage, based on the Merkle Patricia Trie, plays a crucial role in maintaining blockchain state. Besides, we design Nurgle, the first Denial-of-Service attack targeting the state storage. By proliferating intermediate nodes within the state storage, Nurgle forces blockchains to expend additional resources on state maintenance and verification, impairing their performance. We conduct a comprehensive and systematic evaluation of Nurgle, including the factors affecting it, its impact on blockchains, its financial cost, and practically demonstrating the resulting damage to blockchains. The implications of Nurgle extend beyond the performance degradation of blockchains, potentially reducing trust in them and the value of their cryptocurrencies. Additionally, we further discuss three feasible mitigations against Nurgle. At the time of writing, the vulnerability exploited by Nurgle has been confirmed by six mainstream blockchains, and we received thousands of USD bounty from them.