Quantum key distribution with an unknown and untrusted source

The security of a standard bi-directional "plug & play" quantum key distribution (QKD) system has been an open question for a long time. This is mainly because its source is equivalently controlled by an eavesdropper, which means the source is unknown and untrusted. Qualitative discuss...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inarXiv.org
Main Authors Zhao, Yi, Qi, Bing, Hoi-Kwong Lo
Format Paper Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Ithaca Cornell University Library, arXiv.org 25.05.2008
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Summary:The security of a standard bi-directional "plug & play" quantum key distribution (QKD) system has been an open question for a long time. This is mainly because its source is equivalently controlled by an eavesdropper, which means the source is unknown and untrusted. Qualitative discussion on this subject has been made previously. In this paper, we present the first quantitative security analysis on a general class of QKD protocols whose sources are unknown and untrusted. The securities of standard BB84 protocol, weak+vacuum decoy state protocol, and one-decoy decoy state protocol, with unknown and untrusted sources are rigorously proved. We derive rigorous lower bounds to the secure key generation rates of the above three protocols. Our numerical simulation results show that QKD with an untrusted source gives a key generation rate that is close to that with a trusted source.
Bibliography:SourceType-Working Papers-1
ObjectType-Working Paper/Pre-Print-1
content type line 50
ISSN:2331-8422
DOI:10.48550/arxiv.0802.2725