Transitivity of Preferences

• Published in: Psychological review Vol. 118; no. 1; pp. 42 - 56
• Main Authors: Regenwetter, Michel, Dana, Jason, Davis-Stober, Clintin P
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: United States American Psychological Association 01.01.2011
• Subjects: Attitudes; Choice Behavior; Data Analysis; Decision Making; Female; Humans; Illinois; Male; Models, Psychological; Probability; Selection; Statistical Analysis; Stochastic Processes; Undergraduate Students; Illinois
• ISSN: 0033-295X; 1939-1471
• DOI: 10.1037/a0021150

Transitivity of preferences is a fundamental principle shared by most major contemporary rational, prescriptive, and descriptive models of decision making. To have transitive preferences, a person, group, or society that prefers choice option "x" to "y" and "y" to "z" must prefer "x" to "z". Any claim of empirical violations of transitivity by individual decision makers requires evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. We discuss why unambiguous evidence is currently lacking and how to clarify the issue. In counterpoint to Tversky's (1969) seminal "Intransitivity of Preferences," we reconsider his data as well as those from more than 20 other studies of intransitive human or animal decision makers. We challenge the standard operationalizations of transitive preferences and discuss pervasive methodological problems in the collection, modeling, and analysis of relevant empirical data. For example, violations of weak stochastic transitivity do not imply violations of transitivity of preference. Building on past multidisciplinary work, we use parsimonious mixture models, where the space of permissible preference states is the family of (transitive) strict linear orders. We show that the data from many of the available studies designed to elicit intransitive choice are consistent with transitive preferences. (Contains 3 tables and 4 figures.)