Regulation with wage bargaining

In many regulated industries labour unions are strong and there is clear empirical evidence of labour rent-sharing. In this paper, we study optimal regulation in a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining at the firm level. A seemingly robust conclusion, at least when work...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Economic journal (London) Vol. 113; no. 487; pp. 525 - 538
Main Authors Dalen, Dag Morten, Von Der Fehr, Nils-Henrik M, Moen, Espen R
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.04.2003
Blackwell Publishers
Oxford University Press
Subjects
Bargaining
Bargaining power
Commercial regulation
Contract incentives
Contract negotiations
Economic models
Economic regulation
Economic rent
Economics
Incentive pay
Industrial regulation
Labor unions
Price regulation
Regulated industries
Regulation
Studies
Trade unions
Wage and hour regulation
Wage negotiations
Wages
Wages & salaries
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:In many regulated industries labour unions are strong and there is clear empirical evidence of labour rent-sharing. In this paper, we study optimal regulation in a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining at the firm level. A seemingly robust conclusion, at least when worker bargaining power is considerable, is that incentives for cost efficiency should be stronger than in the standard case in which wages do not depend on the regulatory regime.
Bibliography:ark:/67375/WNG-51F4QD4K-X
ArticleID:ECOJ126
istex:C44680F5AC286B454D79BCC8E023D0100FEF137D
We are grateful to Steinar Holden, Managing Editor David de Meza and two anonymous referees for insightful comments.
ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0013-0133
1468-0297
DOI:10.1111/1468-0297.00126