Information Aggregation with Random Ordering: Cascades and Overconfidence
In economic models, it is usually assumed that agents aggregate their private information with all available public information correctly and completely. In this experiment, we identify subjects' updating procedures and analyse the consequences for the aggregation process. Decisions can be base...
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Published in | The Economic journal (London) Vol. 113; no. 484; pp. 166 - 189 |
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Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Oxford, UK
Blackwell Publishing
01.01.2003
Blackwell Publishers Oxford University Press |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
ISSN | 0013-0133 1468-0297 |
DOI | 10.1111/1468-0297.00091 |
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Summary: | In economic models, it is usually assumed that agents aggregate their private information with all available public information correctly and completely. In this experiment, we identify subjects' updating procedures and analyse the consequences for the aggregation process. Decisions can be based on private information with known quality and on the observed decisions of other participants. In this setting with random ordering, information cascades are observable and agents' overconfidence has a positive effect on avoiding a non-revealing aggregation process. However, overconfidence reduces welfare in general. |
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Bibliography: | istex:CD9FE89C6A60BCB2801CD00781DF9B32FF7CE4AA ark:/67375/WNG-V843GRD3-2 The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support for this research which was provided by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (grants No381/1 and We993/7). Carlo Kraemer and Tobias Kremer programmed the software for this project. Helpful comments were received from two anonymous referees, David de Meza (the editor), Rachel Croson, Wolfgang Gerke, Charles Holt, Susanne Prantl and participants at the Economic Science Association 1998 meeting, the European Finance Association 1999 meeting and at the Wharton Finance Micro Lunch seminar. ArticleID:ECOJ091 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 ObjectType-Article-2 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0013-0133 1468-0297 |
DOI: | 10.1111/1468-0297.00091 |