When Intensions Do Not Map onto Extensions: Individual Differences in Conceptualization

Concepts are represented in the mind through knowledge of their extensions (the class of items to which the concept applies) and intensions (features that distinguish that class of items). A common assumption among theories of concepts is that the 2 aspects are intimately related. Hence if there is...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition Vol. 42; no. 4; pp. 505 - 523
Main Authors Hampton, James A, Passanisi, Alessia
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published United States American Psychological Association 01.04.2016
Subjects
Adult
Beliefs
College Students
Comparative Analysis
Concept Formation
Correlation
England (London)
Female
Foreign Countries
Humans
Individual Differences
Individuality
Italy (Sicily)
Judgment
Male
Memory
Prediction
Psychological Tests
Semantics
Young Adult
Italy
United Kingdom (London)
Online AccessGet more information

Cover

More Information
Summary:Concepts are represented in the mind through knowledge of their extensions (the class of items to which the concept applies) and intensions (features that distinguish that class of items). A common assumption among theories of concepts is that the 2 aspects are intimately related. Hence if there is systematic individual variation in concept representation, the variation should correlate between extensional and intensional measures. A pair of individuals with similar extensional beliefs about a given concept should also share similar intensional beliefs. To test this notion, exemplars (extensions) and features (intensions) of common categories were rated for typicality and importance respectively across 2 occasions. Within-subject consistency was greater than between-subjects consensus on each task, providing evidence for systematic individual variation. Furthermore, the similarity structure between individuals for each task was stable across occasions. However, across 5 samples, similarity between individuals for extensional judgments did not map onto similarity between individuals for intensional judgments. The results challenge the assumption common to many theories of conceptual representation that intensions determine extensions and support a hybrid view of concepts where there is a disconnection between the conceptual resources that are used for the 2 tasks.
ISSN:0278-7393
1939-1285
DOI:10.1037/xlm0000198