Side channel analysis of the SHA-3 finalists

• Published in: Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe pp. 1012 - 1017
• Main Authors: Zohner, Michael, Kasper, Michael, Stöttinger, Marc, Huss, Sorin A.
• Format: Conference Proceeding
• Language: English
• Published: San Jose, CA, USA EDA Consortium 12.03.2012
• Series: ACM Conferences
• Subjects: Computer systems organization > Dependable and fault-tolerant systems and networks; General and reference > Cross-computing tools and techniques > Performance; Networks > Network performance evaluation; Security and privacy; Social and professional topics > Computing > technology policy > Computer crime; DPA; side-channel analysis; SHA-3 finalists
• ISBN: 3981080181; 9783981080186
• DOI: 10.5555/2492708.2492960

At the cutting edge of today's security research and development, the SHA-3 competition evaluates a new secure hashing standard in succession to SHA-2. The five remaining candidates of the SHA-3 competition are BLAKE, Grøstl, JH, Keccak, and Skein. While the main focus was on the algorithmic security of the candidates, a side channel analysis has only been performed for BLAKE and Grøstl [1]. In order to equally evaluate all candidates, we identify side channel attacks on JH-MAC, Keccak-MAC, and Skein-MAC and demonstrate the applicability of the attacks by attacking their respective reference implementation. Additionally, we revisit the side channel analysis of Grøstl and introduce a profiling based side channel attack, which emphasizes the importance of side channel resistant hash functions by recovering the input to the hash function using only the measured power consumption.