How Might Agencies and Courts React After Supreme Court Upends 40 Years of Chevron Deference?

• Published in: The Corporate Governance Advisor Vol. 32; no. 5; pp. 5 - 9
• Main Authors: Moelter, Heather, Mohamed, Soraya, Galloway, Alan, Trinchero, Mark, Savage, Christopher W, Seiver, John D, Gossett, David M, Howard, Robert P
• Format: Trade Publication Article
• Language: English
• Published: Englewood Cliffs Aspen Publishers, Inc 01.09.2024
• Subjects: Administrative law; Ambiguity; Courts; Delegation of authority; Federal court decisions; Federal regulation; Fishing; Fishing vessels; Government agencies; Litigation; United States > US
• ISSN: 1067-6163

In Loper Bright, the district court granted summary judgment to the government, holding that the statute authorized the rule while noting that even if the petitioners had identified an ambiguity in the statutory text, deference to the agency's interpretation would be warranted under Chevron. Because there was "some question" as to Congress's intent, the court deferred to the agency's interpretation as a "reasonable" construction of the statute. The Relentless petitioners received similar treatment both in the district court, which relied on Chevron in granting summary judgment to the government, and in the First Circuit, which relied on Chevron to uphold the agency's interpretation of the statute. The Court contrasted this deferential review of "fact-bound determinations" with the Court's "longstanding judicial approach to questions of law"-such as statutory interpretation. The Court also noted that members of the Court including Justice Kagan, the author of the dissent in Loper Bright, have recognized that Chevron's presumption that statutory ambiguities amount to congressional delegation is a fiction. [...]the Court held that de novo review is the traditional standard for questions of law and that the APA should therefore be understood as codifying that standard, noting that "some things go without saying" even in legislation.