NEPAD and Its Achilles Heels

Africa adopted the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) to pursue solutions to chronic economic & political problems. It is distinct from other proposals (eg, structural adjustment) in three ways: (1) It demonstrates political will on behalf of African leadership as opposed to t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAlternatives (Istanbul, Turkey) Vol. 1; no. 4; pp. 232 - 253
Main Author Bekoe, D A
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 01.01.2002
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Summary:Africa adopted the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) to pursue solutions to chronic economic & political problems. It is distinct from other proposals (eg, structural adjustment) in three ways: (1) It demonstrates political will on behalf of African leadership as opposed to the international community. (2) NEPAD has gained the sustained attention of the G8. (3) Some African states have agreed to monitor each other to promote good governance, sound economic policy, & social investment via the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Here, these features are assessed in terms of their capacity to enable NEPAD to achieve its goals & overcome the anticipated impediments to reform. Some attention is given to reviewing past development & democratization efforts, drawing on the policy literature to point up reform issues & opportunities. The NEPAD plan is overviewed, & incentives to comply with NEPAD's stated initiatives are examined. While political will is a significant factor, NEPAD must still contend with the inherently destabilizing characteristics of economic reform, ie, bureaucratic resistance & interest groups. Sustained high-level attention from donors & the G8 must compete with these domestic interest groups resulting in contradictory policies. A reliable & credible APRM is challenged by the incentives for a superficial or narrowly defined review, potentially biased monitoring, & the lack of any teeth in the form of sanctions. J. Zendejas
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ISSN:1303-5525
1303-5525