Distributed Information-theoretical Secure Protocols for Quantum Key Distribution Networks against Malicious Nodes
Quantum key distribution (QKD) networks are expected to enable information-theoretical secure (ITS) communication over a large-scale network. Most researches on relay-based QKD network assume that all relays or nodes are completely trustworthy. However, the malicious behavior of any single node can...
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01.02.2024
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Abstract | Quantum key distribution (QKD) networks are expected to enable information-theoretical secure (ITS) communication over a large-scale network. Most researches on relay-based QKD network assume that all relays or nodes are completely trustworthy. However, the malicious behavior of any single node can undermine security of QKD networks. Current research on QKD networks primarily addresses passive attacks conducted by malicious nodes such as eavesdropping. We suggest a novel paradigm, inspired by distributed systems, to address the active attack by collaborate malicious nodes in QKD networks. Firstly, regarding security, we introduce the ITS distributed authentication scheme, which additionally offers two crucial security properties to QKD networks: identity unforgeability and non-repudiation. Secondly, concerning correctness, our ITS fault-tolerant consensus method, ensures ITS and global consistency with fixed classical broadcast rounds, contrasting with the exponentially message-intensive Byzantine agreement method. Through our simulation, we have shown that our scheme exhibits a significantly lower growth trend in authentication key consumption compared to the original end-to-end pre-shared keys scheme. |
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AbstractList | Quantum key distribution (QKD) networks are expected to enable information-theoretical secure (ITS) communication over a large-scale network. Most researches on relay-based QKD network assume that all relays or nodes are completely trustworthy. However, the malicious behavior of any single node can undermine security of QKD networks. Current research on QKD networks primarily addresses passive attacks conducted by malicious nodes such as eavesdropping. We suggest a novel paradigm, inspired by distributed systems, to address the active attack by collaborate malicious nodes in QKD networks. Firstly, regarding security, we introduce the ITS distributed authentication scheme, which additionally offers two crucial security properties to QKD networks: identity unforgeability and non-repudiation. Secondly, concerning correctness, our ITS fault-tolerant consensus method, ensures ITS and global consistency with fixed classical broadcast rounds, contrasting with the exponentially message-intensive Byzantine agreement method. Through our simulation, we have shown that our scheme exhibits a significantly lower growth trend in authentication key consumption compared to the original end-to-end pre-shared keys scheme. |
Author | Hao-Kun Mao Luo, Yi Li, Qiong |
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Snippet | Quantum key distribution (QKD) networks are expected to enable information-theoretical secure (ITS) communication over a large-scale network. Most researches... |
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SubjectTerms | Cooperation Eavesdropping Fault tolerance Information theory Networks Nodes Quantum cryptography Relay Security Spoofing Trustworthiness |
Title | Distributed Information-theoretical Secure Protocols for Quantum Key Distribution Networks against Malicious Nodes |
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