THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCE SHORTAGE ON DEESCALATION IN A SIMULATED PRICE WAR

• Published in: The International journal of conflict management Vol. 7; no. 1; pp. 5 - 20
• Main Authors: Rick Fry, William, Betz, Brian, Pruitt, Dean G.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: MCB UP Ltd 01.01.1996
• ISSN: 1044-4068; 1758-8545
• DOI: 10.1108/eb022773

A simulated price war between two competing gas stations provided the context to assess the effects on deescalation of the subject's financial shortage, the competitor's financial shortage, and a message from the competitor conveying a nonexploitative intent. Subject shortages encouraged gasoline price increases deescalation and competitor shortages encouraged price decreases escalation. Subjects who were suffering a financial shortage rated their competitor as less likely to cooperate and more likely to exploit them than those who were not. Results were discussed in terms of a simplification of Pruitt and Kimmel's 1977 goalexpectation hypothesis. One possible explanation for our results is that subjects make a comparison of relative strength before choosing either to deescalate or escalate.