THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCE SHORTAGE ON DEESCALATION IN A SIMULATED PRICE WAR
A simulated price war between two competing gas stations provided the context to assess the effects on deescalation of the subject's financial shortage, the competitor's financial shortage, and a message from the competitor conveying a nonexploitative intent. Subject shortages encouraged g...
Saved in:
Published in | The International journal of conflict management Vol. 7; no. 1; pp. 5 - 20 |
---|---|
Main Authors | , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
MCB UP Ltd
01.01.1996
|
Online Access | Get full text |
Cover
Loading…
Summary: | A simulated price war between two competing gas stations provided the context to assess the effects on deescalation of the subject's financial shortage, the competitor's financial shortage, and a message from the competitor conveying a nonexploitative intent. Subject shortages encouraged gasoline price increases deescalation and competitor shortages encouraged price decreases escalation. Subjects who were suffering a financial shortage rated their competitor as less likely to cooperate and more likely to exploit them than those who were not. Results were discussed in terms of a simplification of Pruitt and Kimmel's 1977 goalexpectation hypothesis. One possible explanation for our results is that subjects make a comparison of relative strength before choosing either to deescalate or escalate. |
---|---|
Bibliography: | istex:B222F242C94C89E64B36759B22B1CD72990BACA3 ark:/67375/4W2-VLWQ82WF-P original-pdf:3440070101.pdf filenameID:3440070101 href:eb022773.pdf |
ISSN: | 1044-4068 1758-8545 |
DOI: | 10.1108/eb022773 |