不对称信息下新型储能容量租赁市场的博弈均衡分析

新型储能容量租赁由于低风险和高灵活性正成为一种受到广泛关注的商业模式.为解决能源社区内独立储能商和多个发用电一体产消者在不对称成本信息下的储能容量租赁问题,先通过Harsanyi转换将不对称信息转化成完全信息.然后建立了储能商和产消者间的两阶段扩展式博弈模型.接着设计了基于统一价格机制的市场出清和结算规则.最后分析了统一价格机制下储能商和产消者两阶段完全信息扩展式博弈的子博弈精炼纳什均衡,并通过Brouwer不动点定理证明了均衡的存在性.仿真研究表明,储能容量租赁能显著降低产消者的用电成本和提高储能利用效率.而且基于统一价格机制的博弈均衡在寻找公平租赁价格、增加储能商利润、提高储能容量租赁规模...

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Published in电力系统保护与控制 Vol. 52; no. 13; pp. 13 - 24
Main Authors 徐爽, 万靖, 崔世常, 方仍存, 文劲宇
Format Journal Article
LanguageChinese
Published 国网湖北省电力有限公司经济技术研究院,湖北武汉 430000%强电磁技术全国重点实验室(华中科技大学),湖北武汉 430074 01.07.2024
Subjects
产消者
不对称信息
energy storage leasing
prosumers
asymmetric information
储能租赁
extensive game
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
子博弈精炼纳什均衡
扩展式博弈
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN1674-3415
DOI10.19783/j.cnki.pspc.231673

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Abstract 新型储能容量租赁由于低风险和高灵活性正成为一种受到广泛关注的商业模式.为解决能源社区内独立储能商和多个发用电一体产消者在不对称成本信息下的储能容量租赁问题,先通过Harsanyi转换将不对称信息转化成完全信息.然后建立了储能商和产消者间的两阶段扩展式博弈模型.接着设计了基于统一价格机制的市场出清和结算规则.最后分析了统一价格机制下储能商和产消者两阶段完全信息扩展式博弈的子博弈精炼纳什均衡,并通过Brouwer不动点定理证明了均衡的存在性.仿真研究表明,储能容量租赁能显著降低产消者的用电成本和提高储能利用效率.而且基于统一价格机制的博弈均衡在寻找公平租赁价格、增加储能商利润、提高储能容量租赁规模以及提升社会福利等方面均优于基于歧视价格机制的博弈均衡.
AbstractList 新型储能容量租赁由于低风险和高灵活性正成为一种受到广泛关注的商业模式.为解决能源社区内独立储能商和多个发用电一体产消者在不对称成本信息下的储能容量租赁问题,先通过Harsanyi转换将不对称信息转化成完全信息.然后建立了储能商和产消者间的两阶段扩展式博弈模型.接着设计了基于统一价格机制的市场出清和结算规则.最后分析了统一价格机制下储能商和产消者两阶段完全信息扩展式博弈的子博弈精炼纳什均衡,并通过Brouwer不动点定理证明了均衡的存在性.仿真研究表明,储能容量租赁能显著降低产消者的用电成本和提高储能利用效率.而且基于统一价格机制的博弈均衡在寻找公平租赁价格、增加储能商利润、提高储能容量租赁规模以及提升社会福利等方面均优于基于歧视价格机制的博弈均衡.
Abstract_FL Energy storage capacity leasing is becoming a new business model.It has received a lot of attention because of its low risk and high flexibility.To sovle the problem of energy storage capacity leasing between an independent energy storage operator and multiple prosumers who can simultaneously produce and consume energy in an energy community under asymmetric cost information,first,asymmetric information is transformed into complete information via the Harsanyi transformation.Second,a two-stage extensive game model between the energy storage operator and the prosumers is established.Third,market clearing and settlement rules based on a uniform price mechanism are designed.Finally,the subgame refinement Nash equilibrium of the extensive game with complete information between the operator and the prosumers under the uniform price mechanism is analyzed,and the existence of the equilibrium is proved by the Brouwer fixed point theorem.Simulation studies show that energy storage capacity leasing can significantly reduce the electricity cost of the prosumers and improve the efficiency of energy storage utilization.The game equilibrium of the uniform price mechanism is superior to that of the discriminatory price mechanism in finding fair energy storage capacity leasing prices,increasing the profits of the independent energy storage operator,increasing the scale of energy storage capacity transactions,and improving social welfare.
Author 徐爽
崔世常
方仍存
文劲宇
万靖
AuthorAffiliation 国网湖北省电力有限公司经济技术研究院,湖北武汉 430000%强电磁技术全国重点实验室(华中科技大学),湖北武汉 430074
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Author_FL FANG Rengcun
WEN Jinyu
CUI Shichang
XU Shuang
WAN Jing
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DocumentTitle_FL Game equilibrium analysis of energy storage leasing market with asymmetric information
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Issue 13
Keywords 产消者
不对称信息
energy storage leasing
prosumers
asymmetric information
储能租赁
extensive game
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
子博弈精炼纳什均衡
扩展式博弈
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PublicationTitle 电力系统保护与控制
PublicationTitle_FL Power System Protection and Control
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Publisher 国网湖北省电力有限公司经济技术研究院,湖北武汉 430000%强电磁技术全国重点实验室(华中科技大学),湖北武汉 430074
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Title 不对称信息下新型储能容量租赁市场的博弈均衡分析
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