回收模式相异下消费者偏好对制造商合作策略的影响

F724; 针对传统回收和智能回收在回收方式上存在差异的问题,考虑消费者对智能回收的选择偏好,分别构建了制造商无合作、制造商仅与传统回收商合作、制造商仅与智能回收商(即通过智能回收箱进行产品回收的经销商)合作以及制造商与传统回收商和智能回收商共同合作的决策模型,并对模型进行求解与对比分析.研究表明:以制造商无合作情形为参考,制造商与传统回收商和智能回收商均有合作动机.当制造商仅与传统回收商合作时,智能回收商的利润会受损;当制造商仅与智能回收商合作时,传统回收商的利润会受损.当消费者对智能回收的偏好保持在一定阈值范围内,制造商与智能回收商合作后提升的利润大于制造商与传统回收商合作以及制造商与传统...

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Published in计算机集成制造系统 Vol. 29; no. 12; pp. 4304 - 4326
Main Authors 蒋琼, 王勇, 刘名武
Format Journal Article
LanguageChinese
Published 重庆交通大学经济与管理学院 重庆 400074 01.12.2023
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN1006-5911
DOI10.13196/j.cims.2022.0489

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Abstract F724; 针对传统回收和智能回收在回收方式上存在差异的问题,考虑消费者对智能回收的选择偏好,分别构建了制造商无合作、制造商仅与传统回收商合作、制造商仅与智能回收商(即通过智能回收箱进行产品回收的经销商)合作以及制造商与传统回收商和智能回收商共同合作的决策模型,并对模型进行求解与对比分析.研究表明:以制造商无合作情形为参考,制造商与传统回收商和智能回收商均有合作动机.当制造商仅与传统回收商合作时,智能回收商的利润会受损;当制造商仅与智能回收商合作时,传统回收商的利润会受损.当消费者对智能回收的偏好保持在一定阈值范围内,制造商与智能回收商合作后提升的利润大于制造商与传统回收商合作以及制造商与传统回收商和智能回收商共同合作提升的利润.消费者对智能回收偏好的增加会降低制造商在合作后利润分成的议价能力,但可提高传统回收商和智能回收商在合作后的利润分成的议价能力.
AbstractList F724; 针对传统回收和智能回收在回收方式上存在差异的问题,考虑消费者对智能回收的选择偏好,分别构建了制造商无合作、制造商仅与传统回收商合作、制造商仅与智能回收商(即通过智能回收箱进行产品回收的经销商)合作以及制造商与传统回收商和智能回收商共同合作的决策模型,并对模型进行求解与对比分析.研究表明:以制造商无合作情形为参考,制造商与传统回收商和智能回收商均有合作动机.当制造商仅与传统回收商合作时,智能回收商的利润会受损;当制造商仅与智能回收商合作时,传统回收商的利润会受损.当消费者对智能回收的偏好保持在一定阈值范围内,制造商与智能回收商合作后提升的利润大于制造商与传统回收商合作以及制造商与传统回收商和智能回收商共同合作提升的利润.消费者对智能回收偏好的增加会降低制造商在合作后利润分成的议价能力,但可提高传统回收商和智能回收商在合作后的利润分成的议价能力.
Abstract_FL In view of the differences in recycling modes between traditional recycling and smart recycling,by considering the consumer preference for smart recycling,four closed-loop supply chain models were established to analyze the effects of consumer preference for smart recycling on the cooperation strategy of the manufacturer.The four models included the manufacturer allied with no one,the manufacturer only cooperated with the traditional collector,the manufacturer just co-operated with the smart collector(the recycling dealers who recycled products through smart recycling bins)and the manu-facturer cooperated with both the traditional collector and the smart collector.Then,the optimal decisions under different models were analyzed.The results showed that both the traditional collector and the smart collector had the motivation to participate in cooperation.When the manufacturer only cooperated with the traditional collector,the smart collector's profit was decreased.Meanwhile,when the manufacturer only cooperated with the smart collector,the traditional collector's profit was also decreased.When consumer preference for smart recycling remained within a certain threshold range,the in-creased profit of the manufacturer only cooperated with the smart collector was greater than the increased profits in which the manufacturer only cooperated with the traditional collector and the manufacturer cooperates with both the traditional collector and the smart collector.The increasing in consumer preference for smart recycling would reduce the right of the manufacturer to share profits after cooperation,and increased the proportion of profits shared by the traditional collector and the smart collector after cooperation.
Author 蒋琼
王勇
刘名武
AuthorAffiliation 重庆交通大学经济与管理学院 重庆 400074
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Author_FL WANG Yong
JIANG Qiong
LIU Mingwu
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Keywords smart recycling
competitive recycling
closed-loop supply chain
闭环供应链
consumer recycling preference
竞争回收
消费者回收偏好
cooper-ation strategy
智能回收
合作策略
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Title 回收模式相异下消费者偏好对制造商合作策略的影响
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