Sharp semi-concavity in a non-autonomous control problem and Lp estimates in an optimal-exit MFG

This paper studies a mean field game inspired by crowd motion in which agents evolve in a compact domain and want to reach its boundary minimizing the sum of their travel time and a given boundary cost. Interactions between agents occur through their dynamic, which depends on the distribution of all...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inNonlinear differential equations and applications Vol. 27; no. 2
Main Authors Dweik, Samer, Mazanti, Guilherme
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Cham Springer International Publishing 2020
Springer Nature B.V
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Summary:This paper studies a mean field game inspired by crowd motion in which agents evolve in a compact domain and want to reach its boundary minimizing the sum of their travel time and a given boundary cost. Interactions between agents occur through their dynamic, which depends on the distribution of all agents. We start by considering the associated optimal control problem, showing that semi-concavity in space of the corresponding value function can be obtained by requiring as time regularity only a lower Lipschitz bound on the dynamics. We also prove differentiability of the value function along optimal trajectories under extra regularity assumptions. We then provide a Lagrangian formulation for our mean field game and use classical techniques to prove existence of equilibria, which are shown to satisfy a MFG system. Our main result, which relies on the semi-concavity of the value function, states that an absolutely continuous initial distribution of agents with an L p density gives rise to an absolutely continuous distribution of agents at all positive times with a uniform bound on its L p norm. This is also used to prove existence of equilibria under fewer regularity assumptions on the dynamics thanks to a limit argument.
ISSN:1021-9722
1420-9004
DOI:10.1007/s00030-019-0612-4