GOST的差分故障攻击

为了评估俄罗斯标准密码算法 GOST 的安全性, 提出并讨论了一种针对 GOST 算法的差分故障分析方法. 该方法采用单字节随机故障模型, 利用模加运算部件的特点获取 S 盒的输入差分信息, 并基于 S 盒差分分布统计规律实现密钥恢复. 实验结果表明, 平均7.46次故障引入可以恢复256比特主密钥, 12次故障内完成恢复的实验占比达98, 该方法可以有效地攻击 GOST 算法....

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Published inJournal of Cryptologic Research Vol. 8; no. 4; p. 630
Main Authors XIE, Min, Jia-Qi, LI, TIAN, Feng, 谢敏, 李嘉琪, 田峰
Format Journal Article
LanguageChinese
Published Beijing Chinese Association for Cryptologic Research, Journal of Cryptologic Research 30.08.2021
Subjects
Algorithms
Encryption
Modular units
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN2097-4116
DOI10.13868/j.cnki.jcr.000464

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Abstract 为了评估俄罗斯标准密码算法 GOST 的安全性, 提出并讨论了一种针对 GOST 算法的差分故障分析方法. 该方法采用单字节随机故障模型, 利用模加运算部件的特点获取 S 盒的输入差分信息, 并基于 S 盒差分分布统计规律实现密钥恢复. 实验结果表明, 平均7.46次故障引入可以恢复256比特主密钥, 12次故障内完成恢复的实验占比达98, 该方法可以有效地攻击 GOST 算法.
AbstractList 为了评估俄罗斯标准密码算法 GOST 的安全性, 提出并讨论了一种针对 GOST 算法的差分故障分析方法. 该方法采用单字节随机故障模型, 利用模加运算部件的特点获取 S 盒的输入差分信息, 并基于 S 盒差分分布统计规律实现密钥恢复. 实验结果表明, 平均7.46次故障引入可以恢复256比特主密钥, 12次故障内完成恢复的实验占比达98, 该方法可以有效地攻击 GOST 算法.
Author 李嘉琪
XIE, Min
谢敏
TIAN, Feng
田峰
Jia-Qi, LI
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Snippet 为了评估俄罗斯标准密码算法 GOST 的安全性, 提出并讨论了一种针对 GOST 算法的差分故障分析方法. 该方法采用单字节随机故障模型, 利用模加运算部件的特点获取 S 盒的输入差分信息, 并基于 S 盒差分分布统计规律实现密钥恢复. 实验结果表明, 平均7.46次故障引入可以恢复256比特主密钥,...
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Encryption
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Title GOST的差分故障攻击
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