Armstrong and the Problem of Converse Relations
In "A World of States of Affairs" (Cambridge University Press, 1997) David Armstrong offers a comprehensive metaphysics based on the thesis that the world consists of states of affairs. Among the entities postulated by Armstrong's theory are relations, including non-symmetrical relati...
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Published in | Erkenntnis Vol. 56; no. 2; pp. 215 - 227 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Dordrecht
Kluwer Academic Publishers and Felix Meiner
01.01.2002
Springer Springer Nature B.V |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | In "A World of States of Affairs" (Cambridge University Press, 1997) David Armstrong offers a comprehensive metaphysics based on the thesis that the world consists of states of affairs. Among the entities postulated by Armstrong's theory are relations, including non-symmetrical relations, and while Armstrong does not agree with Russell that all relations have a direction or definite order among their places, he does explicitly acknowledge that the slots of a non-symmetrical relation have a definite order or direction. I first show that non-symmetrical relations pose a problem for Armstrong's theory by raising "The Problem of Converse Relations." I then argue that the best resolution of this problem in the context of Armstrong's theory involves adopting an analysis of the order or direction of a relation that differs from the analysis that Russell assumes. I conclude by discussing a further problem facing Armstrong's ontology: "The Problem of Converse Relational Properties." |
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ISSN: | 0165-0106 1572-8420 |
DOI: | 10.1023/A:1015650310608 |