Location verification using secure distance bounding protocols

• Published in: IEEE International Conference on Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems Conference, 2005 pp. 7 pp. - 840
• Main Authors: Singelee, D., Preneel, B.
• Format: Conference Proceeding
• Language: English
• Published: IEEE 2005
• Subjects: Authentication; Biometrics; Global Positioning System; Immune system; IP networks; Printers; Protocols; Security; Switches; Terrorism
• ISBN: 0780394658; 9780780394650
• ISSN: 2155-6806
• DOI: 10.1109/MAHSS.2005.1542879

Authentication in conventional networks (like the Internet) is usually based upon something you know (e.g., a password), something you have (e.g., a smartcard) or something you are (biometrics). In mobile ad-hoc networks, location information can also be used to authenticate devices and users. We focus on how a provers can securely show that (s)he is within a certain distance to a verifier. Brands and Chaum proposed the distance bounding protocol as a secure solution for this problem. However, this protocol is vulnerable to a so-called "terrorist fraud attack". In this paper, we explain how to modify the distance bounding protocol to make it resistant to this kind of attacks. Recently, two other secure distance bounding protocols were published. We discuss the properties of these protocols and show how to use it as a building block in a location verification scheme