Domestic Institutions and Credible Signals
Audience costs are a central feature of many prominent theories of international conflict. We advance the understanding of audience costs by specifying the domestic institutions necessary to generate them. In our conceptualization, audience cost capacity (ACC) is a function of the availability of al...
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| Published in | International studies quarterly Vol. 56; no. 4; pp. 765 - 776 |
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| Main Authors | , , |
| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | English |
| Published |
Oxford, UK
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
01.12.2012
Wiley Periodicals, Inc |
| Subjects | |
| Online Access | Get full text |
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| Abstract | Audience costs are a central feature of many prominent theories of international conflict. We advance the understanding of audience costs by specifying the domestic institutions necessary to generate them. In our conceptualization, audience cost capacity (ACC) is a function of the availability of alternative rulers and the cost of mobilizing against the incumbent. This conceptualization leads to the first measure of ACC that has variation between more and less democratic political systems and variation within autocracies. We subject our measure to a rigorous set of tests that includes addressing selection effects and temporal treatment effects, neither of which have been fully examined in this research area. The empirical analysis offers strong support for the validity of our measure. |
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| AbstractList | Audience costs are a central feature of many prominent theories of international conflict. We advance the understanding of audience costs by specifying the domestic institutions necessary to generate them. In our conceptualization, audience cost capacity (ACC) is a function of the availability of alternative rulers and the cost of mobilizing against the incumbent. This conceptualization leads to the first measure of ACC that has variation between more and less democratic political systems and variation within autocracies. We subject our measure to a rigorous set of tests that includes addressing selection effects and temporal treatment effects, neither of which have been fully examined in this research area. The empirical analysis offers strong support for the validity of our measure. Adapted from the source document. Audience costs are a central feature of many prominent theories of international conflict. We advance the understanding of audience costs by specifying the domestic institutions necessary to generate them. In our conceptualization, audience cost capacity (ACC) is a function of the availability of alternative rulers and the cost of mobilizing against the incumbent. This conceptualization leads to the first measure of ACC that has variation between more and less democratic political systems and variation within autocracies. We subject our measure to a rigorous set of tests that includes addressing selection effects and temporal treatment effects, neither of which have been fully examined in this research area. The empirical analysis offers strong support for the validity of our measure. Audience costs are a central feature of many prominent theories of international conflict. We advance the understanding of audience costs by specifying the domestic institutions necessary to generate them. In our conceptualization, audience cost capacity (ACC) is a function of the availability of alternative rulers and the cost of mobilizing against the incumbent. This conceptualization leads to the first measure of ACC that has variation between more and less democratic political systems and variation within autocracies. We subject our measure to a rigorous set of tests that includes addressing selection effects and temporal treatment effects, neither of which have been fully examined in this research area. The empirical analysis offers strong support for the validity of our measure. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] Uzonyi, Gary, Mark Souva, and Sona N. Golder. (2012) Domestic Institutions and Credible Signals. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00746.x © 2012 International Studies Association Audience costs are a central feature of many prominent theories of international conflict. We advance the understanding of audience costs by specifying the domestic institutions necessary to generate them. In our conceptualization, audience cost capacity (ACC) is a function of the availability of alternative rulers and the cost of mobilizing against the incumbent. This conceptualization leads to the first measure of ACC that has variation between more and less democratic political systems and variation within autocracies. We subject our measure to a rigorous set of tests that includes addressing selection effects and temporal treatment effects, neither of which have been fully examined in this research area. The empirical analysis offers strong support for the validity of our measure. Reprinted by permission of Blackwell Publishers |
| Author | Golder, Sona N. Souva, Mark Uzonyi, Gary |
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| Notes | Author's note: We would like to thank James Morrow, Brandon Prins, Christopher Reenock, Allan Stam, and Jana von Stein for valuable feedback at various stages of this project. We presented previous versions of this paper at the Peace Science (International) Association, Binghamton University, and the Midwest Political Science Association. Replication material for all tables in the paper and the online appendix are available at http://mailer.fsu.edu/~msouva/research.htm. ArticleID:ISQU746 ark:/67375/WNG-DBD3TGHX-V istex:C82D1C11A1F6BA106CAD20A75D4610FB9FC1AD8B ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 ObjectType-Article-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 |
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