Sequential Detection of Deception Attacks in Networked Control Systems with Watermarking

In this paper, we investigate the role of a physical watermarking signal in quickest detection of a deception attack in a scalar linear control system where the sensor measurements can be replaced by an arbitrary stationary signal generated by an attacker. By adding a random watermarking signal to t...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in2019 18th European Control Conference (ECC) pp. 883 - 890
Main Authors Salimi, Somayeh, Dey, Subhrakanti, Ahlen, Anders
Format Conference Proceeding
LanguageEnglish
Published EUCA 01.06.2019
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

Loading…
Abstract In this paper, we investigate the role of a physical watermarking signal in quickest detection of a deception attack in a scalar linear control system where the sensor measurements can be replaced by an arbitrary stationary signal generated by an attacker. By adding a random watermarking signal to the control action, the controller designs a sequential test based on a Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) method that accumulates the log-likelihood ratio of the joint distribution of the residue and the watermarking signal (under attack) and the joint distribution of the innovations and the watermarking signal under no attack. As the average detection delay in such tests is asymptotically (as the false alarm rate goes to zero) upper bounded by a quantity inversely proportional to the Kullback-Leibler divergence(KLD) measure between the two joint distributions mentioned above, we analyze the effect of the watermarking signal variance on the above KLD. We also analyze the increase in the LQG control cost due to the watermarking signal, and show that there is a tradeoff between quick detection of attacks and the penalty in the control cost. It is shown that by considering a sequential detection test based on the joint distributions of residue/innovations and the watermarking signal, as opposed to the distributions of the residue/innovations only, we can achieve a higher KLD, thus resulting in a reduced average detection delay. We also present some new structural results involving the associated KLD and its behaviour with respect to the attacker's signal power and the watermarking signal power. These somewhat non-intuitive structural results can be used by either the attacker to choose their power to minimize the KLD, and/or by the system designer to choose its watermarking signal variance appropriately to increase the KLD. Numerical results are provided to support our claims.
AbstractList In this paper, we investigate the role of a physical watermarking signal in quickest detection of a deception attack in a scalar linear control system where the sensor measurements can be replaced by an arbitrary stationary signal generated by an attacker. By adding a random watermarking signal to the control action, the controller designs a sequential test based on a Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) method that accumulates the log-likelihood ratio of the joint distribution of the residue and the watermarking signal (under attack) and the joint distribution of the innovations and the watermarking signal under no attack. As the average detection delay in such tests is asymptotically (as the false alarm rate goes to zero) upper bounded by a quantity inversely proportional to the Kullback-Leibler divergence(KLD) measure between the two joint distributions mentioned above, we analyze the effect of the watermarking signal variance on the above KLD. We also analyze the increase in the LQG control cost due to the watermarking signal, and show that there is a tradeoff between quick detection of attacks and the penalty in the control cost. It is shown that by considering a sequential detection test based on the joint distributions of residue/innovations and the watermarking signal, as opposed to the distributions of the residue/innovations only, we can achieve a higher KLD, thus resulting in a reduced average detection delay. We also present some new structural results involving the associated KLD and its behaviour with respect to the attacker's signal power and the watermarking signal power. These somewhat non-intuitive structural results can be used by either the attacker to choose their power to minimize the KLD, and/or by the system designer to choose its watermarking signal variance appropriately to increase the KLD. Numerical results are provided to support our claims.
Author Salimi, Somayeh
Dey, Subhrakanti
Ahlen, Anders
Author_xml – sequence: 1
  givenname: Somayeh
  surname: Salimi
  fullname: Salimi, Somayeh
  organization: Division of Signals and Systems, Uppsala University, Box 534, Uppsala, SE, 75121, Sweden
– sequence: 2
  givenname: Subhrakanti
  surname: Dey
  fullname: Dey, Subhrakanti
  organization: Division of Signals and Systems, Uppsala University, Box 534, Uppsala, SE, 75121, Sweden
– sequence: 3
  givenname: Anders
  surname: Ahlen
  fullname: Ahlen, Anders
  organization: Division of Signals and Systems, Uppsala University, Box 534, Uppsala, SE, 75121, Sweden
BookMark eNotj81Og0AUhcdEF1r7AMbNvAA4v8BdNlitSaOLanTXXOCOTqBDhTFN316iXZ18m_Odc8XOQx-IsRspUqVBwt2yLFMlJKRFDpkW-ozNIS80iFwaI0RxyT429P1DIXrs-D1FqqPvA-_dBDXt_2ARI9btyH3gzxQP_dBSw8s-xKHv-OY4RtqN_ODjF3_HSMMOh9aHz2t24bAbaX7KGXt7WL6Wq2T98vhULtaJV9bGRIEmygw2GUqwThiVIwEIzF3jrDEGpx2AdaOUFHVFQI11YEhWKG1RaT1jt_-9noi2-8FP_uP29Ff_ApMKUMQ
ContentType Conference Proceeding
DBID 6IE
6IL
CBEJK
RIE
RIL
DOI 10.23919/ECC.2019.8796303
DatabaseName IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings
IEEE Proceedings Order Plan All Online (POP All Online) 1998-present by volume
IEEE Xplore All Conference Proceedings
IEEE Electronic Library Online
IEEE Proceedings Order Plans (POP All) 1998-Present
DatabaseTitleList
Database_xml – sequence: 1
  dbid: RIE
  name: IEEE Electronic Library Online
  url: https://proxy.k.utb.cz/login?url=https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
  sourceTypes: Publisher
DeliveryMethod fulltext_linktorsrc
EISBN 9783907144008
3907144007
EndPage 890
ExternalDocumentID 8796303
Genre orig-research
GroupedDBID 6IE
6IL
CBEJK
RIE
RIL
ID FETCH-LOGICAL-i255t-293ee64ad6a195f0427ae990a7fdf5444aece9acd2210cbe9ed5f94e1ba158b33
IEDL.DBID RIE
IngestDate Thu Jun 29 18:38:53 EDT 2023
IsDoiOpenAccess false
IsOpenAccess true
IsPeerReviewed false
IsScholarly false
Language English
LinkModel DirectLink
MergedId FETCHMERGED-LOGICAL-i255t-293ee64ad6a195f0427ae990a7fdf5444aece9acd2210cbe9ed5f94e1ba158b33
OpenAccessLink http://mural.maynoothuniversity.ie/14388/1/SD_sequential.pdf
PageCount 8
ParticipantIDs ieee_primary_8796303
PublicationCentury 2000
PublicationDate 2019-June
PublicationDateYYYYMMDD 2019-06-01
PublicationDate_xml – month: 06
  year: 2019
  text: 2019-June
PublicationDecade 2010
PublicationTitle 2019 18th European Control Conference (ECC)
PublicationTitleAbbrev ECC
PublicationYear 2019
Publisher EUCA
Publisher_xml – name: EUCA
Score 1.8174863
Snippet In this paper, we investigate the role of a physical watermarking signal in quickest detection of a deception attack in a scalar linear control system where...
SourceID ieee
SourceType Publisher
StartPage 883
Title Sequential Detection of Deception Attacks in Networked Control Systems with Watermarking
URI https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8796303
hasFullText 1
inHoldings 1
isFullTextHit
isPrint
link http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwjZ3PS8MwFMfD3MmTyib-JgePZluzJG2OUjeGsCHocLeRH68wlE4kvfjXmx91onjw1pZA2rw23-bl895D6FppWhTGApFWMMJ0TonkFIiwRgmpgdHo0J8vxGzJ7ld81UE3u1gYAIjwGQzCYdzLt1vTBFfZsMj96xJSe-4VI5pitdJGJR3LTA4nZRlYLW_81O5HwZSoF9MDNP_qKWEiL4PG6YH5-JWE8b-3coj635F5-GGnOUeoA3UPrR4jD-2_1Vd8By7CVTXeVv6khVbwrXMhmB5varxI4DdYXCZMHbdZy3HwyeJnFSfr6ELvo-V08lTOSFsxgWz80sARr90AgikrVCZ5FepoKPB6o_LKVpwxpny_UhlL_UrPaJBgeSUZZFplvNDj8THq1tsaThDOCi3ViGlTGMa4zv2PZQV-PhBKUu6f_hT1wqis31JSjHU7IGd_Xz5H-8EyibG6QF333sClV3Onr6IZPwFpNKN2
link.rule.ids 310,311,786,790,795,796,802,27956,55107
linkProvider IEEE
linkToHtml http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwjZ3PS8MwFMfDmAc9qWzib3PwaLY1S9LmKHVj6jYEN9xt5McrDKUT6S7-9eZHVRQP3toSSJvX5tu8fN57CF0qTbPMWCDSCkaYTimRnAIR1ighNTAaHPqTqRjN2d2CLxro6isWBgACfAYdfxj28u3abLyrrJul7nXxqT23nM730hitFbcqaV8msjvIc09rOfPHlj9KpgTFGO6iyWdfERR57mwq3THvv9Iw_vdm9lD7OzYPP3ypzj5qQNlCi8dARLuv9QXfQBXwqhKvC3dSYyv4uqp8OD1elXga0W-wOI-gOq7zlmPvlcVPKkzXwYneRvPhYJaPSF0zgazc4qAiTr0BBFNWqETywlfSUOAUR6WFLThjTLl-pTKWurWe0SDB8kIySLRKeKb7_QPULNclHCKcZFqqHtMmM4xxnbpfywLcjCCUpNw9_RFq-VFZvsa0GMt6QI7_vnyBtkezyXg5vp3en6Adb6VIXJ2iZvW2gTOn7ZU-Dyb9ADIKpso
openUrl ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=proceeding&rft.title=2019+18th+European+Control+Conference+%28ECC%29&rft.atitle=Sequential+Detection+of+Deception+Attacks+in+Networked+Control+Systems+with+Watermarking&rft.au=Salimi%2C+Somayeh&rft.au=Dey%2C+Subhrakanti&rft.au=Ahlen%2C+Anders&rft.date=2019-06-01&rft.pub=EUCA&rft.spage=883&rft.epage=890&rft_id=info:doi/10.23919%2FECC.2019.8796303&rft.externalDocID=8796303