A Simple Questionnaire Can Change Everything: Are Strategy Choices in the Coordination and Ultimatum Games Stable?

This paper presents the results of an experiment designed to study the effect produced on strategy choices when a subject reports risk preferences on a risk scale before engaging in a 2 × 2 coordination game and in an ultimatum game. The main finding is that the act of stating one's own risk pr...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in2015 IEEE International Conference on Smart City/SocialCom/SustainCom (SmartCity) pp. 452 - 456
Main Authors Berninghaus, Siegfried K., Todorova, Lora R., Vogt, Bodo
Format Conference Proceeding
LanguageEnglish
Published IEEE 01.12.2015
Subjects
beliefs
Conferences
coordination game
Economics
Finance
Games
questionnaire
Remuneration
risk preferences
risk scale
ultimatum game
uncertain preferences
Uncertainty
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Summary:This paper presents the results of an experiment designed to study the effect produced on strategy choices when a subject reports risk preferences on a risk scale before engaging in a 2 × 2 coordination game and in an ultimatum game. The main finding is that the act of stating one's own risk preferences significantly alters strategic behavior in the two games. In particular, subjects tend to choose the risk dominant strategy in the coordination game more often when they have previously stated their attitudes to risk. We also find that self-reporting risk preferences significantly decreases the proposers' offers in the ultimatum game.
DOI:10.1109/SmartCity.2015.112