A New Logic-Locking Scheme Resilient to Gate Removal Attack
Logic locking is used to protect intellectual properties and prevent integrated circuit piracy. The satisfiability (SAT)-based attack is one of the most powerful attacks against logic locking. The Anti-SAT logic-locking scheme is subject to the removal and AppSAT attacks. To address these vulnerabil...
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Published in | IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems proceedings pp. 1 - 5 |
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Main Authors | , |
Format | Conference Proceeding |
Language | English |
Published |
IEEE
01.10.2020
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Logic locking is used to protect intellectual properties and prevent integrated circuit piracy. The satisfiability (SAT)-based attack is one of the most powerful attacks against logic locking. The Anti-SAT logic-locking scheme is subject to the removal and AppSAT attacks. To address these vulnerabilities, the G-Anti-SAT block has been proposed. However, in both of these schemes, the resiliency to the SAT attack is dependent on a single product term with a large number of literals in the logic-locking function. The corresponding gates can be easily identified by analyzing the signal probability skew. Once they are removed, the logic-locking block is no longer resistant to the SAT attack. This paper proposes a new logic-locking scheme whose function has check board patterns in the corresponding K-map. Due to the unique patterns, the resistance to the SAT attack is no longer dependent on a single product term. Even if some of the gates are removed, the design is still resistant to the SAT attack. |
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ISBN: | 9781728133201 1728133203 |
ISSN: | 2158-1525 |
DOI: | 10.1109/ISCAS45731.2020.9180709 |