Conclusion: externalism, internalism, and idealism

• Published in: Externalism pp. 217 - 224
• Main Author: Rowlands, Mark
• Format: Book Chapter
• Language: English
• Published: United Kingdom Routledge 2003; Taylor & Francis Group
• Edition: 1
• Subjects: Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge; Non-positional Consciousness; Mind Brain Identity Theories; Vehicle Externalism; Mental Subjects; Chopin; Transcendent Objects; Mental Properties; Twin Earth; Matching Problem; Twin Earth Scenario; Putnam's Twin Earth; Epistemic Internalism; West 53rd Street; Fantastic Voyage; Inverted Earth; Logical Opposite; Sceptical Paradox; Mental Phenomena; MIT Press; Mental Particulars; Location Claim; Possession Claim; Active Bodily Subjects; Propositional Mental States; Content Externalism
• ISBN: 9781902683782; 1902683773; 9781902683775; 1902683781
• DOI: 10.4324/9781315710556-13

Chapter 1 characterized the concept of Cartesian internalism in terms of two claims, one concerning the location of mental phenomena and the other concerning the possession of such phenomena by a subject. Cartesian internalism The Location Claim: any mental phenomenon is spatially located inside the boundaries of the subject, S, that has or undergoes it. The Possession Claim: the possession of any mental phenomenon by a subject S does not depend on any feature that is external to the boundaries of S.