Introduction: internalism and externalism

• Published in: Externalism pp. 1 - 6
• Main Author: Rowlands, Mark
• Format: Book Chapter
• Language: English
• Published: United Kingdom Routledge 2003; Taylor & Francis Group
• Edition: 1
• Subjects: Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge; Mind Brain Identity Theories; Non-positional Consciousness; Vehicle Externalism; Electrical Storms; Chopin; Mental Subjects; Token Identity Theory; Twin Earth; Matching Problem; Twin Earth Scenario; Epistemic Internalism; Putnam's Twin Earth; Fantastic Voyage; Inlet Manifold; Combustion Chamber; Mental Phenomena; MIT Press; Cartesian Materialism; Psychophysical Supervenience; Location Claim; Identifiable Part; Possession Claim; Propositional Mental States; Content Externalism; Descartes's Dualism
• ISBN: 9781902683782; 1902683773; 9781902683775; 1902683781
• DOI: 10.4324/9781315710556-2

According to the Cartesian conception, minds are to be assimilated to the category of substance. Cartesian dualism has been famously ridiculed as the myth of the ghost in the machine. And it was Rene Descartes's decision to make the mind ghostly, that is, non-physical that has drawn the principal fire from dissenters. The Cartesian conception of the mind results from the combination of the Location Claim and the Possession Claim. Descartes's dualism and his internalism have, arguably, the same root: the rise of mechanism associated with the scientific revolution. In recent decades, perhaps the most popular way of developing the idea of materialism is known as functionalism. The most obvious form of Cartesian materialism is what is known as the mind-brain identity theory. This, roughly, is the view that the mind is the brain. Another common way of developing or explaining the idea of materialism is in terms of the concept of supervenience.