Helping Congo Help Itself: What It Will Take to End Africa's Worst War

• Published in: Foreign affairs (New York, N.Y.) Vol. 92; no. 5; pp. 99 - 112
• Main Author: Stearns, Jason K.
• Format: Magazine Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York Council on Foreign Relations 01.09.2013; Council on Foreign Relations, Inc; Council on Foreign Relations NY
• Subjects: Activism; Africa; Armed conflict; Armies; Bureaucracy; Conflict; Conflict resolution; Conflict termination (Military science); Congo; Congo (Kinshasa) foreign relations; Democratic Republic of Congo; Diplomacy; Diplomatic negotiations in international disputes; Diplomats; ESSAYS; Failure analysis; Foreign affairs; Government; Government relations; Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo; Mass Media Violence; Military aspects; Militias; Mining; Pacific settlement of international disputes; Peace; Peace keeping; Peace negotiations; Peacetime; Political aspects; Political reform; Political violence; Politics; Rebellion; Rebellions; Republic of the Congo; Rwanda; Rwandan foreign relations; Termination; United Nations; Violence; War; Congo (Kinshasa); Rwanda; Congo-Democratic Republic of Congo
• ISSN: 0015-7120

It would be easy to label the Democratic Republic of the Congo an irredeemable mess. For almost two decades, the country has been roiled by a series of wars involving neighboring countries and dozens of Congolese militias. This dismal picture is misleading. Congo's problems are complex, but certainly not beyond repair. First, however, it is necessary to diagnose the conflict's root causes and understand its protagonists' interests. Although Western media have often taken shortcuts, focusing in particular on the scourge of sexual violence and conflict minerals, a close reading suggests that it is not local warlords and mining companies that are the key players in this drama but the Congolese and Rwandan governments. Congo's government is not only extremely weak, but it is also beholden to a political logic of patronage that undermines the reform of its own state and encourages the creation of competing armed groups. Meanwhile, the ruling party in Rwanda -- in part due to Congo's weakness and instability, in part due to its own problems -- has backed armed groups in the eastern Kivu region of Congo, an area it considers to be its backyard. Yet conflict in Congo continues not just because of these local protagonists but also due to the failures of the foreign diplomats and activists who have not grappled with the underlying dynamics. This has produced a piecemeal response guided more by the interests of outside powers and those of aid bureaucracies than by a strategy for solving the conflict. Throughout the crisis, donors -- mostly the United States and a handful of European countries -- have supplied over 40 percent of the budgets of Congo and Rwanda, but they have rarely displayed the commensurate political and diplomatic muscle necessary to leverage this aid toward a sustainable solution. Other African governments, meanwhile, have mostly stayed on the sidelines. These diplomatic failings have been particularly striking during the past seven years. Since 2006, when the last serious peace process concluded, donors have adopted a postconflict, or stabilization, strategy, epitomized by a mandate that focuses on supporting a government in Kinshasa that has little manifest will to stabilize its own country. At the same time, the UN peacekeeping mission has been stripped of any role in negotiating between the Congolese government and its enemies. This approach is mistaken. In order to foster a lasting peace, donors must use the billions of dollars in aid money disbursed each year as leverage to induce the governments in Kinshasa and Kigali to stop using armed violence for political gain. Adapted from the source document.