The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law

• Published in: Stanford law review Vol. 66; no. 3; pp. 545 - 609
• Main Authors: Ayres, Ian, Schwartz, Alan
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Stanford students of the Stanford Law School 01.03.2014; Stanford Law School; Stanford University, Stanford Law School
• Subjects: Agreements; Consent; Consent (Law); Consumer advertising; Consumer behavior; Consumer behaviour; Consumer contracts; CONSUMER PROTECTION; Consumer surveys; Consumers; Contract law; CONTRACTS; Decision making; Default; Disclosure; Disclosure of information; Influence; Insurance policies; Internet; Law and legislation; Mathematical optimization; Optimism; Optimization theory; Pessimism; PRIVACY; Provisions; Reading; Regression analysis; RISK MANAGEMENT; Search terms; Social aspects; Social media; Software; Standardized terms of contract; STATISTICS; Strategic planning; Studies; Warnings; UNITED STATES

Instead of promoting informed consumer assent through quixotic attempts to have consumers read ever-expanding disclosures, this Article argues that consumer protection law should focus on "term optimism"—situations in which consumers expect more favorable terms than they actually receive....