Incomplete-Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game

• Published in: Management science Vol. 62; no. 3; pp. 648 - 667
• Main Authors: Attanasi, Giuseppe, Battigalli, Pierpaolo, Manzoni, Elena
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Linthicum INFORMS 01.03.2016; Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
• Subjects: Aversion; Economics and Finance; Endogenous; Game theory; Games; Guilt; Humanities and Social Sciences; incomplete information; Preferences; Psychological aspects; psychological games; Psychological research; Risk aversion; Trust (Psychology); Trust Game; Utility functions; Psychological games; Guilt; Incomplete information; Trust games

In the theory of psychological games it is assumed that players’ preferences on material consequences depend on endogenous beliefs. Most of the applications of this theoretical framework assume that the psychological utility functions representing such preferences are common knowledge. However, this...