Scoring rules for judgment aggregation

• Published in: Social choice and welfare Vol. 42; no. 4; pp. 873 - 911
• Main Author: Dietrich, Franz
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Berlin/Heidelberg Springer 01.04.2014; Springer Berlin Heidelberg; Springer Nature B.V; Springer Verlag
• Subjects: Aggregation; Algebra; Analysis; Choices; Collective behaviour; Decision Making; Economic Models; Economic theory; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Economics; Economics and Finance; Entailment; Game Theory; Humanities and Social Sciences; Individuals; International Political Economy; Judgement; Judgment; Majority voting; Mathematical functions; Mathematical vectors; Original Paper; Paradoxes; Preferences; Präferenztheorie; Public choice; Public Finance; Social and Behav. Sciences; Social Class; Social conditions & trends; Social Policy; Social research; Social welfare; Studies; Truth; Voting paradox; social choice; Kemeny rule; judgment aggregation; Borda rule; scoring rules; distance-based aggregation

This paper introduces a new class of judgment aggregation rules, to be called 'scoring rules' after their famous counterparts in preference aggregation theory. A scoring rule generates the collective judgment set which reaches the highest total 'score' across the individuals, sub...