AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF RISK, INCENTIVES AND THE DELEGATION OF WORKER AUTHORITY

• Published in: Industrial & labor relations review Vol. 63; no. 4; pp. 641 - 661
• Main Authors: DEVARO, JED, KURTULUS, FIDAN ANA
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Los Angeles, CA School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University 01.07.2010; SAGE Publications; ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School; SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC
• Series: Industrial and Labor Relations Review
• Subjects: Authority; Authority control; Decisions; Delegation; Delegation of authority; Earnings; Empirical evidence; Employees; Incentive pay; Incentives; Labor relations; Labor unionization; Labour economics; Modeling; Modelling; Principal-agent models; Principal-agent theory; Private sector; Rights; Risk; Risk aversion; Trade-off; United Kingdom; Work incentives; Workers; Workplaces

The authors empirically test Prendergast's (2002) theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal-agent model to explain the lack of consistent empirical support for a tradeoff between risk and incentives. Using data from the 1998 British WERS, the authors investi...