Failure and Rescue in an Interbank Network

This paper is concerned with systemic risk in an interbank market, modelled as a directed graph of interbank obligations. This builds on the modelling paradigm of Eisenberg and Noe [Eisenberg L, Noe TH (2001) Systemic risk in financial systems. Management Sci. 47(2):236-249] by introducing costs of...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inManagement science Vol. 59; no. 4; pp. 882 - 898
Main Authors Rogers, L. C. G., Veraart, L. A. M.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Linthicum INFORMS 01.04.2013
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

Loading…
More Information
Summary:This paper is concerned with systemic risk in an interbank market, modelled as a directed graph of interbank obligations. This builds on the modelling paradigm of Eisenberg and Noe [Eisenberg L, Noe TH (2001) Systemic risk in financial systems. Management Sci. 47(2):236-249] by introducing costs of default if loans have to be called in by a failing bank. This immediately introduces novel and realistic effects. We find that, in general, many different clearing vectors can arise, among which there is a greatest clearing vector, arrived at by letting banks fail in succession until only solvent banks remain. Such a collapse should be prevented if at all possible. We then study situations in which consortia of banks may have the means and incentives to rescue failing banks. This again departs from the conclusions of the earlier work of Eisenberg and Noe, where in the absence of default losses there would be no incentive for solvent banks to rescue failing banks. We conclude with some remarks about how a rescue consortium might be constructed. This paper was accepted by Wei Xiong, finance.
Bibliography:SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 14
ObjectType-Article-2
content type line 23
ISSN:0025-1909
1526-5501
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.1120.1569