Strategic Ignorance and the Robustness of Social Preferences

• Published in: Management science Vol. 60; no. 11; pp. 2659 - 2665
• Main Author: Grossman, Zachary
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Linthicum INFORMS 01.11.2014; Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
• Subjects: Analysis; Anti-social behaviour; Behavior; Behavioral economics; Behavioral psychology; Computer terminals; default effects; dictator games; Dictators; Earnings; Educational outcomes; Experiments; Fairness; Game theory; Games; Ignorance; Learning; Management science; moral wiggle room; Pay-off; Personal preferences (Social sciences); Preferences; Prosocial behavior; Psychological factors; Psychology; Self image; self-deception; self-signaling; Set (Psychology); Social aspects; Social behavior; Social interaction; social preferences; status quo bias; strategic ignorance; Studies; U.S.A; United States; United States > US

Participants in dictator games frequently avoid learning whether their choice to maximize their own earnings will help or hurt the recipient and then choose selfishly, exploiting the “moral wiggle room” provided by their ignorance. However, this is found in an environment in which the dictator must...