Strategic Ignorance and the Robustness of Social Preferences
Participants in dictator games frequently avoid learning whether their choice to maximize their own earnings will help or hurt the recipient and then choose selfishly, exploiting the “moral wiggle room” provided by their ignorance. However, this is found in an environment in which the dictator must...
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Published in | Management science Vol. 60; no. 11; pp. 2659 - 2665 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Linthicum
INFORMS
01.11.2014
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Participants in dictator games frequently avoid learning whether their choice to maximize their own earnings will help or hurt the recipient and then choose selfishly, exploiting the “moral wiggle room” provided by their ignorance. However, this is found in an environment in which the dictator must actively learn the true payoffs, so inaction means ignorance. Does this effect persist when one must actively choose either to be ignorant or to be informed or when one must actively choose to remain ignorant? In fact, whereas 45% of dictators remain ignorant when one must click to become informed, this drops to 25% when one must click in either case and to 3% when one must click to remain ignorant. Although the exploitation of moral wiggle room is not merely an artifact, it is, much like social behavior itself, subject to environmental and psychological factors that may reinforce or undermine its impact.
Data, as supplemental material, are available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1989
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This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0025-1909 1526-5501 |
DOI: | 10.1287/mnsc.2014.1989 |