Group dynamics in experimental studies—The Bertrand Paradox revisited
Different information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects’ behavior. Considering the repeated Bertrand duopoly game of Dufwenberg and Gneezy [Dufwenberg, M., Gneezy's, U., 2000. Price competition and market concentration: an experimental study. International Journa...
Saved in:
| Published in | Journal of economic behavior & organization Vol. 69; no. 1; pp. 51 - 63 |
|---|---|
| Main Author | |
| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | English |
| Published |
Amsterdam
Elsevier B.V
01.01.2009
Elsevier Elsevier Sequoia S.A |
| Series | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |
| Subjects | |
| Online Access | Get full text |
Cover
Loading…
| Abstract | Different information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects’ behavior. Considering the repeated Bertrand duopoly game of Dufwenberg and Gneezy [Dufwenberg, M., Gneezy's, U., 2000. Price competition and market concentration: an experimental study. International Journal of Industrial Organization 18, 7–22.], we find that population feedback about the prices in other markets outside a subjects’ own current market causes group dynamics that prevent prices from convergence to Nash equilibrium. Limited information comprising only the decisions of a subject’s own opponent, in contrast, leads to competitive behavior. When we extend the number of periods from 10 to 25 in the full information treatment (FULL) we observe a very robust cyclical up and down movement of prices. We can explain tacit coordination in our experiment with an extended learning direction model and leadership by example. |
|---|---|
| AbstractList | Different information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects' behavior. Considering the repeated Bertrand duopoly game of Dufwenberg and Gneezy [Dufwenberg, M., Gneezy's, U., 2000. Price competition and market concentration: an experimental study. International Journal of Industrial Organization 18, 7-22.], we find that population feedback about the prices in other markets outside a subjects' own current market causes group dynamics that prevent prices from convergence to Nash equilibrium. Limited information comprising only the decisions of a subject's own opponent, in contrast, leads to competitive behavior. When we extend the number of periods from 10 to 25 in the full information treatment (FULL) we observe a very robust cyclical up and down movement of prices. We can explain tacit coordination in our experiment with an extended learning direction model and leadership by example. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] Different information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects' behavior. Considering the repeated Bertrand duopoly game of Dufwenberg and Gneezy [Dufwenberg, M., Gneezy's, U., 2000. Price competition and market concentration: an experimental study. International Journal of Industrial Organization 18, 7-22.], we find that population feedback about the prices in other markets outside a subjects' own current market causes group dynamics that prevent prices from convergence to Nash equilibrium. Limited information comprising only the decisions of a subject's own opponent, in contrast, leads to competitive behavior. When we extend the number of periods from 10 to 25 in the full information treatment (FULL) we observe a very robust cyclical up and down movement of prices. We can explain tacit coordination in our experiment with an extended learning direction model and leadership by example. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.] Different information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects' behavior. Considering the repeated Bertrand duopoly game of Dufwenberg and Gneezy [Dufwenberg, M., Gneezy's, U., 2000. Price competition and market concentration: an experimental study. International Journal of Industrial Organization 18, 7-22.], we find that population feedback about the prices in other markets outside a subjects' own current market causes group dynamics that prevent prices from convergence to Nash equilibrium. Limited information comprising only the decisions of a subject's own opponent, in contrast, leads to competitive behavior. When we extend the number of periods from 10 to 25 in the full information treatment (FULL) we observe a very robust cyclical up and down movement of prices. We can explain tacit coordination in our experiment with an extended learning direction model and leadership by example. All rights reserved, Elsevier Different information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects’ behavior. Considering the repeated Bertrand duopoly game of Dufwenberg and Gneezy [Dufwenberg, M., Gneezy's, U., 2000. Price competition and market concentration: an experimental study. International Journal of Industrial Organization 18, 7–22.], we find that population feedback about the prices in other markets outside a subjects’ own current market causes group dynamics that prevent prices from convergence to Nash equilibrium. Limited information comprising only the decisions of a subject’s own opponent, in contrast, leads to competitive behavior. When we extend the number of periods from 10 to 25 in the full information treatment (FULL) we observe a very robust cyclical up and down movement of prices. We can explain tacit coordination in our experiment with an extended learning direction model and leadership by example. |
| Author | Bruttel, Lisa V. |
| Author_xml | – sequence: 1 givenname: Lisa V. surname: Bruttel fullname: Bruttel, Lisa V. email: lisa.bruttel@uni-konstanz.de organization: University of Konstanz, Department of Economics, Box D-131, 78457 Konstanz, Germany |
| BackLink | http://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeejeborg/v_3a69_3ay_3a2009_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a51-63.htm$$DView record in RePEc https://hal.science/hal-00654973$$DView record in HAL |
| BookMark | eNp9kc2O0zAUhSM0SHQGXoBVxALEIsU_sZNIbIYRtEiVYDGsLce5oa5SO9hONd3xEDwhT8KNAixmUUvXjo6-c3Sjc51dOe8gy15SsqaEyneH9QFav2aE1CisCWFPshWtq6aglaBX2QqhqmCyps-y6xgPBE_FmlW22QQ_jXl3dvpoTcyty-FhhGCP4JIe8pimzkL8_fPX_R7yDxBS0K7Lv-qgO_-QBzjZaBN0z7OnvR4ivPj73mTfPn28v9sWuy-bz3e3u8JIxlPBSUt62ZtW9JpQzSgrK0p64FVLm7aiUDJDO8FqaUD0VEuACoWmE9Bp0zb8Jnu75O71oEZcU4ez8tqq7e1OzRohUpRNxU8U2TcLOwb_Y4KY1NFGA8OgHfgpqkqUlAtGOJKvL5IclyyllAi-egQe_BQc_rFinNScCTFD2wUKMIL5vyUAzCWF7-qkuJYNXmcc7Gz-tDgUZ8QRVEmu9umIUfUSZYKPMUCvjE06We-wBzsoStTcvzqoOVrN_c8a9o9W9sj6b5GLpveLCbDDk4WgorHgDHQ2gEmq8_aS_Q-qqMtA |
| CODEN | JEBOD9 |
| CitedBy_id | crossref_primary_10_1111_joes_12025 crossref_primary_10_1007_s10683_015_9438_z crossref_primary_10_1016_j_socec_2023_101987 crossref_primary_10_1007_s10614_019_09955_2 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_econlet_2013_05_011 crossref_primary_10_1177_1098611115570896 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2519000 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ijindorg_2010_06_004 crossref_primary_10_1111_agec_12690 crossref_primary_10_1111_ecin_12328 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_euroecorev_2014_01_003 crossref_primary_10_1038_srep07937 crossref_primary_10_1111_1468_0106_12066 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2425030 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_econlet_2012_04_098 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ijindorg_2012_05_006 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_4651058 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_1937803 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_euroecorev_2013_08_008 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_3057986 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_socec_2015_07_006 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_1804302 |
| Cites_doi | 10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4 10.1016/j.geb.2004.03.005 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.10.007 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.07.012 10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00033-8 10.1111/1467-937X.00233 10.1257/0002828042002741 10.1257/aer.89.1.335 10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00031-4 10.1007/s11238-004-3672-8 10.1016/0167-2681(86)90021-1 10.1016/j.geb.2005.10.001 10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.002 10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00235-9 10.1111/1468-0297.00418 |
| ContentType | Journal Article |
| Copyright | 2008 Elsevier B.V. Copyright Elsevier Sequoia S.A. Jan 2009 Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License |
| Copyright_xml | – notice: 2008 Elsevier B.V. – notice: Copyright Elsevier Sequoia S.A. Jan 2009 – notice: Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License |
| DBID | AAYXX CITATION DKI X2L 7QJ 8BJ FQK JBE 1XC VOOES |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002 |
| DatabaseName | CrossRef RePEc IDEAS RePEc Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts (ASSIA) International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) International Bibliography of the Social Sciences International Bibliography of the Social Sciences Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL) Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL) (Open Access) |
| DatabaseTitle | CrossRef International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts (ASSIA) |
| DatabaseTitleList | International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts (ASSIA) International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) |
| Database_xml | – sequence: 1 dbid: DKI name: RePEc IDEAS url: http://ideas.repec.org/ sourceTypes: Index Database |
| DeliveryMethod | fulltext_linktorsrc |
| Discipline | Business |
| EISSN | 1879-1751 0167-2681 |
| EndPage | 63 |
| ExternalDocumentID | oai_HAL_hal_00654973v1 1621641121 eeejeborg_v_3a69_3ay_3a2009_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a51_63_htm 10_1016_j_jebo_2008_10_002 S0167268108001996 |
| Genre | Feature |
| GroupedDBID | --K --M -~X .~1 0R~ 13V 1B1 1OL 1RT 1~. 1~5 29K 3R3 4.4 457 4G. 5GY 5VS 63O 6TJ 7-5 71M 8P~ 9JO AABNK AACTN AADFP AAEDT AAEDW AAFFL AAGJA AAIAV AAIKJ AAKOC AALRI AAOAW AAPFB AAQFI AAQXK AAXUO ABFNM ABIVO ABJNI ABKBG ABLJU ABMAC ABMVD ABOYX ABXDB ABYKQ ACDAQ ACGFO ACGFS ACHQT ACHRH ACNTT ACRLP ACROA ADBBV ADEZE ADFHU ADIYS ADMUD AEBSH AEKER AEYQN AFFNX AFKWA AFODL AFTJW AFYLN AGHFR AGTHC AGUBO AGYEJ AHHHB AI. AIEXJ AIIAU AIKHN AITUG AJBFU AJOXV AJWLA ALEQD ALMA_UNASSIGNED_HOLDINGS AMFUW AMRAJ ASPBG AVWKF AXJTR AXLSJ AZFZN BEHZQ BEZPJ BGSCR BKOJK BKOMP BLXMC BNSAS BNTGB BPUDD BULVW BZJEE CS3 D-I DU5 EBS EFJIC EFLBG EJD EO8 EO9 EP2 EP3 F0J F5P FDB FEDTE FGOYB FIRID FNPLU FYGXN G-2 G-Q GBLVA HLX HMB HVGLF HZ~ IHE IXIXF J1W KOM LG8 LPU LY5 M41 MO0 MS~ N9A O-L O9- OAUVE OZT P-8 P-9 P2P PC. PQQKQ Q38 R2- RIG ROL RPZ SBM SCC SDF SDG SDP SEB SEE SES SEW SPCBC SSB SSF SSY SSZ T5K TN5 UQL VH1 WUQ XPP YK3 YQT ZKB ZMT ~G- AATTM AAXKI AAYWO AAYXX ABWVN ACRPL ACVFH ADCNI ADMHG ADNMO AEIPS AEUPX AFJKZ AFPUW AFXIZ AGCQF AGQPQ AGRNS AIGII AIIUN AKBMS AKRWK AKYEP ANKPU APXCP BNPGV CITATION SSH 08R 0R 1 8P ABPTK ADALY DKI G- H-W HZ IPNFZ K M MS PQEST STF X X2L 7QJ 8BJ EFKBS FQK JBE 1XC VOOES |
| ID | FETCH-LOGICAL-c623t-30b0f6fcb5fa01a2124710fe37b19b71e42c1d5286ce5f1a6ee7c1d9d5edacb93 |
| IEDL.DBID | AIKHN |
| ISSN | 0167-2681 |
| IngestDate | Fri May 09 12:17:22 EDT 2025 Mon Jul 21 09:45:37 EDT 2025 Thu Aug 07 15:10:36 EDT 2025 Fri Jul 25 08:17:36 EDT 2025 Wed Aug 18 03:49:21 EDT 2021 Thu Apr 24 23:06:27 EDT 2025 Tue Jul 01 04:04:10 EDT 2025 Fri Feb 23 02:26:50 EST 2024 |
| IsDoiOpenAccess | true |
| IsOpenAccess | true |
| IsPeerReviewed | true |
| IsScholarly | true |
| Issue | 1 |
| Keywords | Learning D43 Leadership by example Tacit collusion Experiment Bertrand duopoly C92 D83 C72 Social Sciences & Humanities |
| Language | English |
| License | https://www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0 Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
| LinkModel | DirectLink |
| MergedId | FETCHMERGED-LOGICAL-c623t-30b0f6fcb5fa01a2124710fe37b19b71e42c1d5286ce5f1a6ee7c1d9d5edacb93 |
| Notes | SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 ObjectType-Article-2 content type line 23 ObjectType-Article-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 |
| OpenAccessLink | https://hal.science/hal-00654973 |
| PQID | 230832556 |
| PQPubID | 45653 |
| PageCount | 13 |
| ParticipantIDs | hal_primary_oai_HAL_hal_00654973v1 proquest_miscellaneous_754135203 proquest_miscellaneous_37104666 proquest_journals_230832556 repec_primary_eeejeborg_v_3a69_3ay_3a2009_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a51_63_htm crossref_citationtrail_10_1016_j_jebo_2008_10_002 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jebo_2008_10_002 elsevier_sciencedirect_doi_10_1016_j_jebo_2008_10_002 |
| ProviderPackageCode | CITATION AAYXX |
| PublicationCentury | 2000 |
| PublicationDate | 2009-01-01 |
| PublicationDateYYYYMMDD | 2009-01-01 |
| PublicationDate_xml | – month: 01 year: 2009 text: 2009-01-01 day: 01 |
| PublicationDecade | 2000 |
| PublicationPlace | Amsterdam |
| PublicationPlace_xml | – name: Amsterdam |
| PublicationSeriesTitle | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |
| PublicationTitle | Journal of economic behavior & organization |
| PublicationYear | 2009 |
| Publisher | Elsevier B.V Elsevier Elsevier Sequoia S.A |
| Publisher_xml | – name: Elsevier B.V – name: Elsevier – name: Elsevier Sequoia S.A |
| References | Abbink, Sadrieh, Zamir (bib1) 2004; 57 Gächter, S., Renner, E., 2006. Leaders as belief managers for the voluntary provision of public goods. Working Paper, University of Nottingham. Huck (bib10) 2004 Altavilla, Luini, Sbriglia (bib2) 2006; 61 Güth, Levati, Sutter, van der Heijden (bib9) 2007; 91 Selten, Apesteguia (bib16) 2005; 51 Huck, Normann, Oechssler (bib11) 2000; 18 Engelmann, Strobel (bib6) 2004; 94 Neugebauer, Selten (bib13) 2006; 54 Dufwenberg, Gneezy (bib5) 2000; 18 Selten, Buchta (bib17) 1999 Bohnet, Frey (bib3) 1999; 89 Offermann, Potters, Sonnemans (bib15) 2002; 69 Huck, Normann, Oechssler (bib12) 1999; 109 Selten, Stoecker (bib18) 1986; 7 Dufwenberg, Gneezy (bib4) 2002; 48 Fischbacher (bib7) 2007; 10 Ockenfels, Selten (bib14) 2005; 51 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib8 Fischbacher (10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib7) 2007; 10 Abbink (10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib1) 2004; 57 Dufwenberg (10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib5) 2000; 18 Neugebauer (10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib13) 2006; 54 Dufwenberg (10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib4) 2002; 48 Huck (10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib10) 2004 Selten (10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib17) 1999 Huck (10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib12) 1999; 109 Ockenfels (10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib14) 2005; 51 Selten (10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib16) 2005; 51 Selten (10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib18) 1986; 7 Altavilla (10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib2) 2006; 61 Güth (10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib9) 2007; 91 Engelmann (10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib6) 2004; 94 Bohnet (10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib3) 1999; 89 Huck (10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib11) 2000; 18 Offermann (10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib15) 2002; 69 |
| References_xml | – volume: 54 start-page: 183 year: 2006 end-page: 204 ident: bib13 article-title: Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets publication-title: Games and Economic Behavior – volume: 51 start-page: 171 year: 2005 end-page: 192 ident: bib16 article-title: Experimentally observed imitation and cooperation in price competition on the circle publication-title: Games and Economic Behavior – volume: 61 start-page: 632 year: 2006 end-page: 652 ident: bib2 article-title: Social learning in market games publication-title: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization – start-page: 79 year: 1999 end-page: 102 ident: bib17 article-title: Experimental sealed bid first price auctions with directly observed bid functions publication-title: Games and Human Behavior: Essays in the Honor of Amnon Rapoport – volume: 109 start-page: 80 year: 1999 end-page: 95 ident: bib12 article-title: Learning in cournot oligopoly: an experiment publication-title: The Economic Journal – volume: 89 start-page: 335 year: 1999 end-page: 339 ident: bib3 article-title: Social distance and other-regarding behavior in dictator games: comment publication-title: American Economic Review – volume: 10 start-page: 171 year: 2007 end-page: 178 ident: bib7 article-title: z-Tree - Zurich toolbox for readymade economic experiments publication-title: Experimental Economics – volume: 51 start-page: 155 year: 2005 end-page: 170 ident: bib14 article-title: Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions publication-title: Games and Economic Behavior – volume: 18 start-page: 7 year: 2000 end-page: 22 ident: bib5 article-title: Price competition and market concentration: an experimental study publication-title: International Journal of Industrial Organization – start-page: 105 year: 2004 end-page: 114 ident: bib10 article-title: Oligopoly publication-title: Economics lab. An intensive course in experimental economic – volume: 91 start-page: 1023 year: 2007 end-page: 1042 ident: bib9 article-title: Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments publication-title: Journal of Public Economics – volume: 7 start-page: 47 year: 1986 end-page: 70 ident: bib18 article-title: End behavior in sequences of finite prisoner’s dilemma supergames publication-title: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization – volume: 18 start-page: 39 year: 2000 end-page: 57 ident: bib11 article-title: Does information about competitors’ actions increase or decrease competition in experimental oligopoly markets? publication-title: International Journal of Industrial Organization – volume: 94 start-page: 857 year: 2004 end-page: 869 ident: bib6 article-title: Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments publication-title: American Economic Review – volume: 48 start-page: 431 year: 2002 end-page: 444 ident: bib4 article-title: Information disclosure in auctions: an experiment publication-title: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization – volume: 57 start-page: 25 year: 2004 end-page: 57 ident: bib1 article-title: Fairness, public good, and emotional aspects of punishment behavior publication-title: Theory and Decision – reference: Gächter, S., Renner, E., 2006. Leaders as belief managers for the voluntary provision of public goods. Working Paper, University of Nottingham. – volume: 69 start-page: 973 year: 2002 end-page: 997 ident: bib15 article-title: Imitation and belief learning in an oligopoly experiment publication-title: Review of Economic Studies – volume: 10 start-page: 171 year: 2007 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib7 article-title: z-Tree - Zurich toolbox for readymade economic experiments publication-title: Experimental Economics doi: 10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4 – volume: 51 start-page: 171 year: 2005 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib16 article-title: Experimentally observed imitation and cooperation in price competition on the circle publication-title: Games and Economic Behavior doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.03.005 – volume: 91 start-page: 1023 year: 2007 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib9 article-title: Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments publication-title: Journal of Public Economics doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.10.007 – start-page: 105 year: 2004 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib10 article-title: Oligopoly – volume: 61 start-page: 632 year: 2006 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib2 article-title: Social learning in market games publication-title: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.07.012 – start-page: 79 year: 1999 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib17 article-title: Experimental sealed bid first price auctions with directly observed bid functions – volume: 18 start-page: 39 year: 2000 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib11 article-title: Does information about competitors’ actions increase or decrease competition in experimental oligopoly markets? publication-title: International Journal of Industrial Organization doi: 10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00033-8 – volume: 69 start-page: 973 year: 2002 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib15 article-title: Imitation and belief learning in an oligopoly experiment publication-title: Review of Economic Studies doi: 10.1111/1467-937X.00233 – volume: 94 start-page: 857 year: 2004 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib6 article-title: Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments publication-title: American Economic Review doi: 10.1257/0002828042002741 – volume: 89 start-page: 335 year: 1999 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib3 article-title: Social distance and other-regarding behavior in dictator games: comment publication-title: American Economic Review doi: 10.1257/aer.89.1.335 – volume: 18 start-page: 7 year: 2000 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib5 article-title: Price competition and market concentration: an experimental study publication-title: International Journal of Industrial Organization doi: 10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00031-4 – volume: 57 start-page: 25 year: 2004 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib1 article-title: Fairness, public good, and emotional aspects of punishment behavior publication-title: Theory and Decision doi: 10.1007/s11238-004-3672-8 – volume: 7 start-page: 47 year: 1986 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib18 article-title: End behavior in sequences of finite prisoner’s dilemma supergames publication-title: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization doi: 10.1016/0167-2681(86)90021-1 – volume: 54 start-page: 183 year: 2006 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib13 article-title: Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets publication-title: Games and Economic Behavior doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.10.001 – volume: 51 start-page: 155 year: 2005 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib14 article-title: Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions publication-title: Games and Economic Behavior doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.002 – volume: 48 start-page: 431 year: 2002 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib4 article-title: Information disclosure in auctions: an experiment publication-title: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization doi: 10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00235-9 – volume: 109 start-page: 80 year: 1999 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib12 article-title: Learning in cournot oligopoly: an experiment publication-title: The Economic Journal doi: 10.1111/1468-0297.00418 – ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002_bib8 |
| SSID | ssj0000729 |
| Score | 2.0045397 |
| Snippet | Different information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects’ behavior. Considering the repeated Bertrand duopoly game of Dufwenberg... Different information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects' behavior. Considering the repeated Bertrand duopoly game of Dufwenberg... |
| SourceID | hal proquest repec crossref elsevier |
| SourceType | Open Access Repository Aggregation Database Index Database Enrichment Source Publisher |
| StartPage | 51 |
| SubjectTerms | Bertrand duopoly Bertrand duopoly Tacit collusion Learning Leadership by example Experiment Convergence Duopoly Economic information Experiment Experiments Game theory Group dynamics Information sharing Leadership Leadership by example Learning Market analysis Markets Nash equilibrium Prices Studies Tacit collusion |
| Title | Group dynamics in experimental studies—The Bertrand Paradox revisited |
| URI | https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002 http://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeejeborg/v_3a69_3ay_3a2009_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a51-63.htm https://www.proquest.com/docview/230832556 https://www.proquest.com/docview/37104666 https://www.proquest.com/docview/754135203 https://hal.science/hal-00654973 |
| Volume | 69 |
| hasFullText | 1 |
| inHoldings | 1 |
| isFullTextHit | |
| isPrint | |
| link | http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwnV3NbtQwEB51uxLigvgVodBaiBsKG8exnRyX0nbLQoWAit4sx3barSC7yqYVXBAPwRPyJB3nZ1kO7YGDY2liK9bEnhnb38wAvLBpYbgsojAVzIYJZwblYJSELtNOap7KNPK-w--PxOQ4eXvCTzZgt_eF8bDKTva3Mr2R1h1l1HFztJjNRp88gD724bRSb6dkYgDDmGUCp_ZwfDidHP0VyLJJVtaE-PYdOt-ZFuZ1jsu6hVQ2IK_4Ov00OPNAyTUrdFi5hTNrymj_LtzprEgybgd6DzZceR9u9SD2B3DQHCkR26abX5JZSdZD-ZNlix788-s3ThPy2lU1qixLPuhK2_l3UjUu52iLPoTj_b3Pu5OwS5kQGrRj6pBFeVSIwuS80BHVqJdQ-USFYzKnWS6pS2JDLY9TYRwvqBbOSSRkljurTZ6xR7BZzkv3GEiRoia3LjW4Q0niKNfC5gzVf4pVwfIkANozSpkunrhPa_FV9cCxc-WZ2ya6pD4KaRzAy1WfRRtN48bWvOe_-mdOKBT3N_Z7jj9r9QEfQHsyfqc8rfGlzSS7pAFs9f9Sdct2qXA_hhKOcxHAzuotrjd_iaJLN79YKib9rbjAFuSaFpKjYcDjiAUwbubIaiTOOT_W6lRdKqZFho8fWPwFFVYzLBTLAgunSjB1Vn978p882ILb7b2XPyx6Cpt1deGeoflU59swePWTbneLxNfTj1-mSH0zPbwCgzUbuQ |
| linkProvider | Elsevier |
| linkToHtml | http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwnV1Lb9QwELb6kKAXxFOkBWohbihsHMeOc1wqygLbColW6s1y_KBbQXaVTSu4IH4Ev5Bfwkwey3JoDxwcS44tW2PPw_Y3Y0JeOBWsyEMSK8ldnAluQQ4mWewL43MjVK4S9B0-OpaT0-z9mTjbIAeDLwzCKnvZ38n0Vlr3JaOemqPFbDb6hAD6FMNpKbRTCrlJtqEvhdz56sdfnAeGxh4CfGP13nOmA3ldAFN3gMoW4pVep502zxEmuWaDbtd-4e2aKjq8S-70NiQdd8O8RzZ8dZ_cGiDsD8jb9kCJuu6x-SWdVXQ9kD9ddtjB3z9_wSKhr33dgMJy9KOpjZt_o3XrcA6W6ENyevjm5GAS9w8mxBasmCbmSZkEGWwpgkmYAa0EqicJnuclK8qc-Sy1zIlUSetFYEZ6n0NB4YR3xpYFf0S2qnnlHxMaFOhx55WF_UmWJqWRruSg_BVkgZdZRNhAKG37aOL4qMUXPcDGLjQSt3vmkmEM0jQiL1dtFl0sjRtri4H--p8VoUHY39juOUzWqgMMnz0ZTzWWtZ60Rc6vWET2hrnUPdMuNezGQL4JISOyv_oL3IZXKKby88ul5jneiUuoQa-pkQswC0Sa8IiM2zWyGon3Hsdaf9ZXmhtZwOc7JLyegmwGiUFaQBJMS67Pm6-7_0mDfXJ7cnI01dN3xx_2yE53A4bHRk_IVlNf-qdgSDXls5ZR_gBgZBnh |
| openUrl | ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Group+dynamics+in+experimental+studies%E2%80%94The+Bertrand+Paradox+revisited&rft.jtitle=Journal+of+economic+behavior+%26+organization&rft.au=Bruttel%2C+Lisa+V.&rft.date=2009-01-01&rft.issn=0167-2681&rft.volume=69&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=51&rft.epage=63&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016%2Fj.jebo.2008.10.002&rft.externalDBID=n%2Fa&rft.externalDocID=10_1016_j_jebo_2008_10_002 |
| thumbnail_l | http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/lc.gif&issn=0167-2681&client=summon |
| thumbnail_m | http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/mc.gif&issn=0167-2681&client=summon |
| thumbnail_s | http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/sc.gif&issn=0167-2681&client=summon |