CEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China: Evidence from micro data

In this paper, we use unique data on China's listed firms from 1998 to 2002 to show that CEO turnover is significantly and inversely related to firm performance, although the magnitude of the relationship is modest. In addition, we find that this turnover-performance link is weaker for listed f...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of Comparative Economics Vol. 34; no. 4; pp. 796 - 817
Main Authors Kato, Takao, Long, Cheryl
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published San Diego Elsevier Inc 01.12.2006
Elsevier
Elsevier BV
SeriesJournal of Comparative Economics
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Summary:In this paper, we use unique data on China's listed firms from 1998 to 2002 to show that CEO turnover is significantly and inversely related to firm performance, although the magnitude of the relationship is modest. In addition, we find that this turnover-performance link is weaker for listed firms that are still controlled by the state and those that have a relatively weak non-state controlling shareholder. In contrast, the appointment of independent directors enhances the turnover-performance link. Moreover, the listing suspension mechanism, adopted by China's securities regulatory agency, appears to be effective in improving the turnover-performance tie. Finally, listed firms with CEOs holding additional positions among the controlling shareholders have a weaker turnover-performance link. Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (4) (2006) 796–817.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0147-5967
1095-7227
DOI:10.1016/j.jce.2006.08.002