Harris, J., & Bromiley, P. (2007). Incentives to Cheat: The Influence of Executive Compensation and Firm Performance on Financial Misrepresentation. Organization science (Providence, R.I.), 18(3), 350. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1060.0241
Chicago Style (17th ed.) CitationHarris, Jared, and Philip Bromiley. "Incentives to Cheat: The Influence of Executive Compensation and Firm Performance on Financial Misrepresentation." Organization Science (Providence, R.I.) 18, no. 3 (2007): 350. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1060.0241.
MLA (9th ed.) CitationHarris, Jared, and Philip Bromiley. "Incentives to Cheat: The Influence of Executive Compensation and Firm Performance on Financial Misrepresentation." Organization Science (Providence, R.I.), vol. 18, no. 3, 2007, p. 350, https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1060.0241.