Trust between individuals and groups: Groups are less trusting than individuals but just as trustworthy
We compare the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder; the amount sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum. In a...
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Published in | Journal of economic psychology Vol. 28; no. 6; pp. 646 - 657 |
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Main Authors | , , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Amsterdam
Elsevier B.V
01.12.2007
Elsevier Science Elsevier Elsevier Sequoia S.A |
Series | Journal of Economic Psychology |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Abstract | We compare the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder; the amount sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum. In a 2×2 design, the players in the roles of sender and responder are either individuals or groups of three players (who conduct face-to-face discussions to decide on a collective group strategy). We find that groups in the role of sender send smaller amounts than individuals, and expect lower returns. In particular, groups send nothing more often than individuals do (and are even more likely to do so when the responder is another group). Groups and individuals in the role of responder return on average the same fraction of the amount sent. Hence, we conclude that groups are less trusting than individuals, but just as trustworthy. |
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AbstractList | We compare the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder the amount sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum. In a 2 x 2 design, the players in the roles of sender and responder are either individuals or groups of three players (who conduct face-to-face discussions to decide on a collective group strategy). We find that groups in the role of sender send smaller amounts than individuals, and expect lower returns. In particular, groups send nothing more often than individuals do (and are even more likely to do so when the responder is another group). Groups and individuals in the role of responder return on average the same fraction of the amount sent. Hence, we conclude that groups are less trusting than individuals, but just as trustworthy. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] We compare the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder; the amount sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum. In a 2x2 design, the players in the roles of sender and responder are either individuals or groups of three players (who conduct face-to-face discussions to decide on a collective group strategy). We find that groups in the role of sender send smaller amounts than individuals, and expect lower returns. In particular, groups send nothing more often than individuals do (and are even more likely to do so when the responder is another group). Groups and individuals in the role of responder return on average the same fraction of the amount sent. Hence, we conclude that groups are less trusting than individuals, but just as trustworthy. All rights reserved, Elsevier We compare the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder; the amount sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum. In a 2×2 design, the players in the roles of sender and responder are either individuals or groups of three players (who conduct face-to-face discussions to decide on a collective group strategy). We find that groups in the role of sender send smaller amounts than individuals, and expect lower returns. In particular, groups send nothing more often than individuals do (and are even more likely to do so when the responder is another group). Groups and individuals in the role of responder return on average the same fraction of the amount sent. Hence, we conclude that groups are less trusting than individuals, but just as trustworthy. |
Author | Kocher, Martin G. Kugler, Tamar Sutter, Matthias Bornstein, Gary |
Author_xml | – sequence: 1 givenname: Tamar surname: Kugler fullname: Kugler, Tamar email: tkugler@eller.arizona.edu organization: Department of Management and Organizations, University of Arizona, 1130 E. Helen St., Tucson, AZ 85721, United States – sequence: 2 givenname: Gary surname: Bornstein fullname: Bornstein, Gary organization: Department of Psychology and Center for Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel – sequence: 3 givenname: Martin G. surname: Kocher fullname: Kocher, Martin G. organization: CREED, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands – sequence: 4 givenname: Matthias surname: Sutter fullname: Sutter, Matthias organization: Department of Economics, Innsbruck University, Austria |
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Snippet | We compare the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any... |
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SubjectTerms | Behavior Biological and medical sciences Comparative analysis Data analysis Decision making Economic psychology Experimental games Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology Game theory Group behavior Group behaviour Groups Individual behaviour Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry Psychology. Psychophysiology Social interactions. Communication. Group processes Social psychology Strategic behaviour Studies Trust Trust game |
Title | Trust between individuals and groups: Groups are less trusting than individuals but just as trustworthy |
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