Trust between individuals and groups: Groups are less trusting than individuals but just as trustworthy

We compare the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder; the amount sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum. In a...

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Published inJournal of economic psychology Vol. 28; no. 6; pp. 646 - 657
Main Authors Kugler, Tamar, Bornstein, Gary, Kocher, Martin G., Sutter, Matthias
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.12.2007
Elsevier Science
Elsevier
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
SeriesJournal of Economic Psychology
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Abstract We compare the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder; the amount sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum. In a 2×2 design, the players in the roles of sender and responder are either individuals or groups of three players (who conduct face-to-face discussions to decide on a collective group strategy). We find that groups in the role of sender send smaller amounts than individuals, and expect lower returns. In particular, groups send nothing more often than individuals do (and are even more likely to do so when the responder is another group). Groups and individuals in the role of responder return on average the same fraction of the amount sent. Hence, we conclude that groups are less trusting than individuals, but just as trustworthy.
AbstractList We compare the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder the amount sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum. In a 2 x 2 design, the players in the roles of sender and responder are either individuals or groups of three players (who conduct face-to-face discussions to decide on a collective group strategy). We find that groups in the role of sender send smaller amounts than individuals, and expect lower returns. In particular, groups send nothing more often than individuals do (and are even more likely to do so when the responder is another group). Groups and individuals in the role of responder return on average the same fraction of the amount sent. Hence, we conclude that groups are less trusting than individuals, but just as trustworthy. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
We compare the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder; the amount sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum. In a 2x2 design, the players in the roles of sender and responder are either individuals or groups of three players (who conduct face-to-face discussions to decide on a collective group strategy). We find that groups in the role of sender send smaller amounts than individuals, and expect lower returns. In particular, groups send nothing more often than individuals do (and are even more likely to do so when the responder is another group). Groups and individuals in the role of responder return on average the same fraction of the amount sent. Hence, we conclude that groups are less trusting than individuals, but just as trustworthy. All rights reserved, Elsevier
We compare the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder; the amount sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum. In a 2×2 design, the players in the roles of sender and responder are either individuals or groups of three players (who conduct face-to-face discussions to decide on a collective group strategy). We find that groups in the role of sender send smaller amounts than individuals, and expect lower returns. In particular, groups send nothing more often than individuals do (and are even more likely to do so when the responder is another group). Groups and individuals in the role of responder return on average the same fraction of the amount sent. Hence, we conclude that groups are less trusting than individuals, but just as trustworthy.
Author Kocher, Martin G.
Kugler, Tamar
Sutter, Matthias
Bornstein, Gary
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  givenname: Gary
  surname: Bornstein
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Snippet We compare the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any...
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SubjectTerms Behavior
Biological and medical sciences
Comparative analysis
Data analysis
Decision making
Economic psychology
Experimental games
Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology
Game theory
Group behavior
Group behaviour
Groups
Individual behaviour
Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry
Psychology. Psychophysiology
Social interactions. Communication. Group processes
Social psychology
Strategic behaviour
Studies
Trust
Trust game
Title Trust between individuals and groups: Groups are less trusting than individuals but just as trustworthy
URI https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2006.12.003
http://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeejoepsy/v_3a28_3ay_3a2007_3ai_3a6_3ap_3a646-657.htm
https://www.proquest.com/docview/231214965/abstract/
https://search.proquest.com/docview/36788717
Volume 28
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