The Impact of Elections on Cooperation: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Uganda
Communities often rely on sanctioning to induce public goods contributions. Past studies focus on how external agencies or peer sanctioning induce cooperation. In this article, we focus instead on the role played by centralized authorities, internal to the community. Combining "lab-in-the-field...
Saved in:
| Published in | American journal of political science Vol. 56; no. 4; pp. 964 - 985 |
|---|---|
| Main Authors | , |
| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | English |
| Published |
Malden, USA
Blackwell Publishing Inc
01.10.2012
Wiley Subscription Services Blackwell Publishing Ltd |
| Subjects | |
| Online Access | Get full text |
Cover
Loading…
| Abstract | Communities often rely on sanctioning to induce public goods contributions. Past studies focus on how external agencies or peer sanctioning induce cooperation. In this article, we focus instead on the role played by centralized authorities, internal to the community. Combining "lab-in-the-field" experiments with observational data on 1,541 Ugandan farmers from 50 communities, we demonstrate the positive effect of internal centralized sanctioning authorities on cooperative behavior. We also show that the size of this effect depends on the political process by which authority is granted: subjects electing leaders contribute more to public goods than subjects who were assigned leaders through a lottery. To test the ecological validity of our findings, we relate farmers' behavior in the experiment to their level of cooperation in their community organization. We show that deference to authority in the controlled setting predicts cooperative behavior in the farmers' natural environment, in which they face a similar social dilemma. |
|---|---|
| AbstractList | Communities often rely on sanctioning to induce public goods contributions. Past studies focus on how external agencies or peer sanctioning induce cooperation. In this article, we focus instead on the role played by centralized authorities, internal to the community. Combining “lab‐in‐the‐field” experiments with observational data on 1,541 Ugandan farmers from 50 communities, we demonstrate the positive effect of internal centralized sanctioning authorities on cooperative behavior. We also show that the size of this effect depends on the political process by which authority is granted: subjects electing leaders contribute more to public goods than subjects who were assigned leaders through a lottery. To test the ecological validity of our findings, we relate farmers’ behavior in the experiment to their level of cooperation in their community organization. We show that deference to authority in the controlled setting predicts cooperative behavior in the farmers’ natural environment, in which they face a similar social dilemma. Communities often rely on sanctioning to induce public goods contributions. Past studies focus on how external agencies or peer sanctioning induce cooperation. In this article, we focus instead on the role played by centralized authorities, internal to the community. Combining "lab-in-the-field" experiments with observational data on 1,541 Ugandan farmers from 50 communities, we demonstrate the positive effect of internal centralized sanctioning authorities on cooperative behavior. We also show that the size of this effect depends on the political process by which authority is granted: subjects electing leaders contribute more to public goods than subjects who were assigned leaders through a lottery. To test the ecological validity of our findings, we relate farmers' behavior in the experiment to their level of cooperation in their community organization. We show that deference to authority in the controlled setting predicts cooperative behavior in the farmers' natural environment, in which they face a similar social dilemma.Communities often rely on sanctioning to induce public goods contributions. Past studies focus on how external agencies or peer sanctioning induce cooperation. In this article, we focus instead on the role played by centralized authorities, internal to the community. Combining "lab-in-the-field" experiments with observational data on 1,541 Ugandan farmers from 50 communities, we demonstrate the positive effect of internal centralized sanctioning authorities on cooperative behavior. We also show that the size of this effect depends on the political process by which authority is granted: subjects electing leaders contribute more to public goods than subjects who were assigned leaders through a lottery. To test the ecological validity of our findings, we relate farmers' behavior in the experiment to their level of cooperation in their community organization. We show that deference to authority in the controlled setting predicts cooperative behavior in the farmers' natural environment, in which they face a similar social dilemma. Communities often rely on sanctioning to induce public goods contributions. Past studies focus on how external agencies or peer sanctioning induce cooperation. In this article, we focus instead on the role played by centralized authorities, internal to the community. Combining 'lab-in-the-field' experiments with observational data on 1,541 Ugandan farmers from 50 communities, we demonstrate the positive effect of internal centralized sanctioning authorities on cooperative behavior. We also show that the size of this effect depends on the political process by which authority is granted: subjects electing leaders contribute more to public goods than subjects who were assigned leaders through a lottery. To test the ecological validity of our findings, we relate farmers' behavior in the experiment to their level of cooperation in their community organization. We show that deference to authority in the controlled setting predicts cooperative behavior in the farmers' natural environment, in which they face a similar social dilemma. Adapted from the source document. Communities often rely on sanctioning to induce public goods contributions. Past studies focus on how external agencies or peer sanctioning induce cooperation. In this article, we focus instead on the role played by centralized authorities, internal to the community. Combining 'lab-in-the‐ ;field' experiments with observational data on 1,541 Ugandan farmers from 50 communities, we demonstrate the positive effect of internal centralized sanctioning authorities on cooperative behavior. We also show that the size of this effect depends on the political process by which authority is granted: subjects electing leaders contribute more to public goods than subjects who were assigned leaders through a lottery. To test the ecological validity of our findings, we relate farmers' behavior in the experiment to their level of cooperation in their community organization. We show that deference to authority in the controlled setting predicts cooperative behavior in the farmers' natural environment, in which they face a similar social dilemma. Reprinted by permission of Blackwell Publishers Communities often rely on sanctioning to induce public goods contributions. Past studies focus on how external agencies or peer sanctioning induce cooperation. In this article, we focus instead on the role played by centralized authorities, internal to the community. Combining "lab-in-the-field" experiments with observational data on 1,541 Ugandan farmers from 50 communities, we demonstrate the positive effect of internal centralized sanctioning authorities on cooperative behavior. We also show that the size of this effect depends on the political process by which authority is granted: subjects electing leaders contribute more to public goods than subjects who were assigned leaders through a lottery. To test the ecological validity of our findings, we relate farmers' behavior in the experiment to their level of cooperation in their community organization. We show that deference to authority in the controlled setting predicts cooperative behavior in the farmers' natural environment, in which they face a similar social dilemma. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] |
| Author | Grossman, Guy Baldassarri, Delia |
| Author_xml | – sequence: 1 givenname: Guy surname: Grossman fullname: Grossman, Guy – sequence: 2 givenname: Delia surname: Baldassarri fullname: Baldassarri, Delia |
| BackLink | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23729913$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed |
| BookMark | eNqNUl1v0zAUjdAQ6wY_AWSJF15S7PgjNhJIo-rGpqogbRO8IMtNr1eXxC5xOrp_j7OOMnjZ_GJfnXOP78c5yPZ88JBliOAhSeftckg4wzlXuBwWmBRDjLkSw82TbLAD9rIBxqrIueR0PzuIcYlTzBR9lu0XtCyUInSQfb9YADptVqbqULBoXEPVueAjCh6NQlhBa_r4HRpfuzn4CpBtQ4MMmphZ7nzeLSA_dlDP0XiTyK4B3yHn0eWV8XPzPHtqTR3hxd19mF0ejy9Gn_LJ55PT0dEkr3gpRV4qKilgYiugdi4tpkYIyqRloJglYJjC1Foyo0RJwyrJACRlllYzxVWJ6WH2Yau7Ws8amFepiNbUepXqMe2NDsbpfxHvFvoqXGsqhOCqSAJv7gTa8HMNsdONixXUtfEQ1lETWYg0yJLSh6lclJgVBSMPU0nBSqYk76mv_6Muw7r1aWiaYFlQjAXp-3x1v89dg3_2mQhyS6jaEGMLdkchWPfW0UvdO0T3DtG9dfStdfTm7wx3qZXrbpefJubqxwi83wr8cjXcPPpjfXT25Ty9Uv7Lbf4ydqG91xslJREy4fkWd7GDzQ437Q8tSlpy_XV6or-dq-nHM870lP4GYjvzcw |
| CODEN | AJPLB4 |
| CitedBy_id | crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ssresearch_2017_03_001 crossref_primary_10_1007_s40881_023_00158_y crossref_primary_10_1016_j_socec_2023_101997 crossref_primary_10_1177_0010414017720708 crossref_primary_10_1111_ssqu_12910 crossref_primary_10_1017_S1355770X16000322 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_irle_2021_106003 crossref_primary_10_1017_S0003055413000580 crossref_primary_10_1017_S0007123421000375 crossref_primary_10_1093_esr_jcad078 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_4166685 crossref_primary_10_1111_padm_12722 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2951008 crossref_primary_10_1177_0010414018774372 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_4881198 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_worlddev_2018_06_004 crossref_primary_10_1177_0951629815586885 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_3884714 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jebo_2017_06_012 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jebo_2019_12_007 crossref_primary_10_1287_orsc_2021_1515 crossref_primary_10_1371_journal_pone_0255987 crossref_primary_10_1111_ssqu_13289 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_socec_2019_04_002 crossref_primary_10_1146_annurev_soc_073014_112242 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jebo_2021_03_004 crossref_primary_10_1017_S1537592716003029 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jebo_2019_10_011 crossref_primary_10_23919_JSC_2020_0002 crossref_primary_10_1111_ajps_12139 crossref_primary_10_1017_S0043887115000210 crossref_primary_10_1007_s40881_015_0010_6 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ajic_2018_10_015 crossref_primary_10_1111_1467_8489_12376 crossref_primary_10_1080_14480220_2018_1576324 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jdeveco_2024_103317 crossref_primary_10_1111_boer_12140 crossref_primary_10_1017_psrm_2023_52 crossref_primary_10_1093_ej_ueab057 crossref_primary_10_1093_jleo_ewz004 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2903950 crossref_primary_10_1007_s10726_016_9478_6 crossref_primary_10_1007_s40503_016_0035_0 crossref_primary_10_1111_rego_12385 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_worlddev_2021_105507 crossref_primary_10_1086_685545 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jebo_2019_03_007 crossref_primary_10_1080_19390459_2014_934089 crossref_primary_10_1257_aer_p20171016 crossref_primary_10_1017_S0003055418000266 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jebo_2017_07_024 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jpubeco_2014_10_003 crossref_primary_10_1093_ajae_aau117 crossref_primary_10_1111_ajps_12315 crossref_primary_10_1093_ajae_aat066 crossref_primary_10_1111_ecca_12352 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2817417 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2247147 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2764872 crossref_primary_10_1111_ajps_12071 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_euroecorev_2021_103749 crossref_primary_10_1017_XPS_2020_10 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2905310 crossref_primary_10_1177_0010414016679177 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_1902639 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2932094 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_wre_2018_12_002 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_worlddev_2019_104819 crossref_primary_10_1007_s11127_019_00702_7 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_electstud_2023_102638 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_cresp_2021_100016 crossref_primary_10_1146_annurev_soc_073014_112445 crossref_primary_10_1093_sf_soy017 crossref_primary_10_1017_S0007123417000308 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_4471223 crossref_primary_10_1086_682418 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_3078121 crossref_primary_10_3390_g11040061 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2727329 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2659840 crossref_primary_10_1017_S0007123416000569 crossref_primary_10_1371_journal_pone_0058750 crossref_primary_10_1017_S1930297500006975 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_4053673 crossref_primary_10_1093_sf_sov110 crossref_primary_10_1111_ecin_12766 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_econmod_2017_05_014 crossref_primary_10_1111_ajps_12363 crossref_primary_10_1007_s10797_019_09539_8 crossref_primary_10_1017_S004388711700020X crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jbusres_2022_03_088 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_ejpoleco_2022_102354 crossref_primary_10_1007_s10100_013_0326_3 crossref_primary_10_1257_mic_20200038 crossref_primary_10_1126_sciadv_abj7377 crossref_primary_10_1093_isq_sqad107 crossref_primary_10_1007_s00355_020_01284_w crossref_primary_10_1111_conl_12387 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_3380938 crossref_primary_10_1007_s10683_022_09750_1 crossref_primary_10_1177_00223433211042792 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_worlddev_2019_104765 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2831139 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jce_2018_07_017 |
| Cites_doi | 10.1111/j.0023-9216.2005.00077.x 10.56021/9780801851575 10.1016/j.tree.2007.06.012 10.1093/0199262055.001.0001 10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.091106.121756 10.2139/ssrn.1903119 10.1177/0022002707302796 10.1016/j.jce.2010.07.005 10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00394-9 10.1111/j.1467-9930.1986.tb00380.x 10.1515/auk-2005-0107 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.09.004 10.1596/0-8213-5166-4 10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00071-4 10.1017/S0003055408080234 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02288.x 10.1111/j.1748-5991.2009.01066.x 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01472.x 10.1017/CBO9780511609336 10.1126/science.1133755 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.10.007 10.1037/0003-066X.37.3.245 10.1017/S0003055407070499 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.022 10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.060107.154037 10.4159/9780674042605 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.07.005 10.1111/j.1467-6478.2005.00338.x 10.1177/106591290505800201 10.1177/0002764209338793 10.1214/aoms/1177729694 10.2307/2669365 10.1098/rspb.2008.1082 10.1177/0010414007306862 10.1038/nature04201 10.1073/pnas.0630443100 10.4159/9780674041660 10.1002/sim.3107 10.1017/CBO9780511607875 10.1111/j.1467-9558.2007.00307.x 10.2307/3090147 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00068.x 10.1080/00220380701848327 10.1017/S0022381609990235 10.1017/CBO9780511762888 10.1073/pnas.1105456108 10.2307/1964229 10.1038/415137a 10.7551/mitpress/4771.001.0001 10.1017/CBO9780511807763 10.1257/aer.99.2.287 10.1126/science.1183665 10.1257/jep.21.2.153 10.1086/261953 10.1086/428716 10.1017/CBO9780511791307 10.1017/CBO9780511659935 10.1016/j.cub.2009.07.027 10.1177/0002764209338795 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00056.x 10.1126/science.1177418 10.2307/2111672 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.011 10.1146/annurev-polisci-042409-152654 10.1257/000282806777211658 10.1017/S0003055410000079 10.1177/0002764209338797 10.1177/0022002797041006003 10.1007/s10683-007-9192-y 10.1086/498587 |
| ContentType | Journal Article |
| Copyright | 2012 Midwest Political Science Association 2012, Midwest Political Science Association 2012, Midwest Political Science Association 2012 |
| Copyright_xml | – notice: 2012 Midwest Political Science Association – notice: 2012, Midwest Political Science Association – notice: 2012, Midwest Political Science Association 2012 |
| DBID | BSCLL AAYXX CITATION NPM 7UB 8BJ FQK JBE 7X8 5PM |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00596.x |
| DatabaseName | Istex CrossRef PubMed Worldwide Political Science Abstracts International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) International Bibliography of the Social Sciences International Bibliography of the Social Sciences MEDLINE - Academic PubMed Central (Full Participant titles) |
| DatabaseTitle | CrossRef PubMed International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) Worldwide Political Science Abstracts MEDLINE - Academic |
| DatabaseTitleList | CrossRef MEDLINE - Academic Worldwide Political Science Abstracts International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) PubMed International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) |
| Database_xml | – sequence: 1 dbid: NPM name: PubMed url: https://proxy.k.utb.cz/login?url=http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?db=PubMed sourceTypes: Index Database |
| DeliveryMethod | fulltext_linktorsrc |
| Discipline | Political Science |
| EISSN | 1540-5907 |
| EndPage | 985 |
| ExternalDocumentID | PMC3666592 2778604711 23729913 10_1111_j_1540_5907_2012_00596_x AJPS596 23317168 ark_67375_WNG_XS9NBJ54_N |
| Genre | article Journal Article Feature |
| GeographicLocations | Uganda |
| GeographicLocations_xml | – name: Uganda |
| GrantInformation_xml | – fundername: NICHD NIH HHS grantid: R24 HD047879 – fundername: National Institute of Child Health & Human Development : NICHD grantid: R24 HD047879 || HD |
| GroupedDBID | -DZ -ET -~X .3N .GA .Y3 0-V 05W 0R~ 10A 1OC 1OL 23M 2AX 2FS 2KS 31~ 33P 3R3 3V. 4.4 50Y 50Z 51W 51Y 52M 52O 52Q 52S 52T 52U 52W 5GY 5HH 5LA 5VS 66C 6J9 6OB 702 7PT 7WY 8-0 8-1 8-3 8-4 8-5 85S 8FL 8G5 8R4 8R5 8UM 8VB 930 A04 AABNI AAESR AAHHS AANKH AAONW AAOUF AARRQ AASGY AAXRX AAZKR ABBHK ABCQN ABCQX ABCUV ABEML ABJNI ABLJU ABPFR ABPPZ ABPQH ABPVW ABSOO ABTAH ABUWG ABXSQ ABYAD ACAHQ ACBKW ACBWZ ACCFJ ACCZN ACFBH ACGFO ACGFS ACHQT ACNCT ACPOU ACSCC ACTWD ACUBG ACXQS ADACV ADBBV ADEMA ADEOM ADIZJ ADKYN ADMGS ADMHG ADULT ADXAS ADZMN ADZOD AEEZP AEGXH AEIGN AEIMD AEQDE AEUPB AEUQT AEUYR AFBPY AFEBI AFFNX AFFPM AFGKR AFKFF AFKRA AFPWT AFXHP AFZJQ AHBTC AIAGR AIFKG AIURR AIWBW AJBDE AJUXI AKVCP ALAGY ALMA_UNASSIGNED_HOLDINGS ALSLI ALUQN AMBMR AMYDB ARALO ASPBG ASTYK AS~ AVWKF AZBYB AZFZN AZQEC AZVAB BAFTC BDRZF BENPR BEZIV BFHJK BKOMP BMXJE BNVMJ BPHCQ BQESF BROTX BRXPI BSCLL BY8 CAG CCPQU CJ0 COF CS3 D-C D-D DCZOG DPSOV DPXWK DR2 DRFUL DRSSH DWQXO EAU EBS EBU EJD ESX F00 F01 F5P FAC FAS FEDTE FJW FRNLG FVMVE G-S G.N G50 GNUQQ GODZA GROUPED_ABI_INFORM_COMPLETE GUQSH HF~ HGD HGLYW HVGLF HZI HZ~ H~9 IHE IPSME IX1 J0M JAAYA JAS JBMMH JBZCM JENOY JHFFW JKQEH JLEZI JLXEF JPL JSODD JST K1G K48 K60 K6~ KC- L7B LATKE LC2 LC4 LEEKS LH4 LITHE LOXES LP6 LP7 LUTES LW6 LYRES M0C M2L M2O M2R MEWTI MK4 MRFUL MRSSH MSFUL MSSSH MVM MXFUL MXSSH N04 N06 N9A NEJ NF~ NHB O66 O9- OIG OMK P2P P2W P2Y P4C PADUT PQBIZ PQBZA PQQKQ PROAC Q.N Q11 Q2X QB0 QWB R.K ROL RWL RX1 RXW SA0 SUPJJ TAE TKY TN5 UB1 UBZ UKR UMD V8K VQA W8V W99 WBKPD WH7 WIH WII WMRSR WOHZO WQZ WRC WSUWO WXSBR X6Y XG1 XIH XSW YXE YZZ ZCG ZL0 ZY4 ZZTAW ~45 ~IA ~WP AAHQN AAMMB AAMNL AANHP AAYCA ABAWQ ACHJO ACRPL ACYXJ ADNMO AEFGJ AEYWJ AFWVQ AGQPQ AGXDD AIDQK AIDYY ALVPJ AFYRF AAYXX AGHNM CITATION PHGZM PHGZT NPM 7UB 8BJ FQK JBE 7X8 5PM |
| ID | FETCH-LOGICAL-c5786-79383e01fce3fd8f03a66348f4e94f1ea4903ff1b3198a4c84ee834f3cb959703 |
| IEDL.DBID | DR2 |
| ISSN | 0092-5853 |
| IngestDate | Thu Aug 21 14:22:28 EDT 2025 Fri Jul 11 09:14:34 EDT 2025 Fri Jul 11 16:38:38 EDT 2025 Thu Jul 10 22:10:55 EDT 2025 Fri Jul 25 21:47:58 EDT 2025 Thu Apr 03 07:06:50 EDT 2025 Thu Apr 24 23:04:35 EDT 2025 Tue Jul 01 02:44:48 EDT 2025 Wed Jan 22 17:05:35 EST 2025 Thu Jul 03 22:54:44 EDT 2025 Wed Oct 30 09:48:33 EDT 2024 |
| IsPeerReviewed | true |
| IsScholarly | true |
| Issue | 4 |
| Language | English |
| LinkModel | DirectLink |
| MergedId | FETCHMERGED-LOGICAL-c5786-79383e01fce3fd8f03a66348f4e94f1ea4903ff1b3198a4c84ee834f3cb959703 |
| Notes | ark:/67375/WNG-XS9NBJ54-N ArticleID:AJPS596 istex:55CD536050B2F48663B4C3652C625C583377DAB1 http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/guygrossman Eguíluz et al. 2005 dbalda@princeton.edu ggros@sas.upenn.edu Delia Baldassarri is Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, 147 Wallace Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 Social differentiation denotes the tendency of groups and communities to develop hierarchies, in which social roles are defined as a set of rights and duties members are expected to fulfill We are grateful to Alex Barnard, Eliana Horn, Vivian Lu, and Sylvie Hoster and to our local team of enumerators for excellent research assistance. We thank Diego Gambetta, Benjamin Goodrich, Elizabeth Sperber, Kristin Michelitch, Laura Paler, Timothy Frye, Kimuli Kasara, Michael Hechter, Macartan Humphreys, David Laitin, David Stasavage, three anonymous reviewers, and participants in various seminars and conferences for helpful comments. D.B. gratefully acknowledges support from the NSF Grant SES(IOS)‐0924778 and the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies. G.G. gratefully acknowledges support from the NSF Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant SES‐0921204 and Princeton University's Office of Population Research. Data for replication can be found at Guy Grossman is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, 225 Stiteler Hall, 208 S. 37th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104‐6215 . SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 ObjectType-Article-2 content type line 23 ObjectType-Article-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 |
| PMID | 23729913 |
| PQID | 1082300610 |
| PQPubID | 41523 |
| PageCount | 22 |
| ParticipantIDs | pubmedcentral_primary_oai_pubmedcentral_nih_gov_3666592 proquest_miscellaneous_1826585733 proquest_miscellaneous_1567042241 proquest_miscellaneous_1124749851 proquest_journals_1082300610 pubmed_primary_23729913 crossref_primary_10_1111_j_1540_5907_2012_00596_x crossref_citationtrail_10_1111_j_1540_5907_2012_00596_x wiley_primary_10_1111_j_1540_5907_2012_00596_x_AJPS596 jstor_primary_23317168 istex_primary_ark_67375_WNG_XS9NBJ54_N |
| ProviderPackageCode | CITATION AAYXX |
| PublicationCentury | 2000 |
| PublicationDate | October 2012 |
| PublicationDateYYYYMMDD | 2012-10-01 |
| PublicationDate_xml | – month: 10 year: 2012 text: October 2012 |
| PublicationDecade | 2010 |
| PublicationPlace | Malden, USA |
| PublicationPlace_xml | – name: Malden, USA – name: United States – name: Oxford |
| PublicationTitle | American journal of political science |
| PublicationTitleAlternate | Am J Pol Sci |
| PublicationYear | 2012 |
| Publisher | Blackwell Publishing Inc Wiley Subscription Services Blackwell Publishing Ltd |
| Publisher_xml | – name: Blackwell Publishing Inc – name: Wiley Subscription Services – name: Blackwell Publishing Ltd |
| References | Boyd, Robert, Herbert Gintis, and Samuel Bowles. 2010. "Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare. Science 328: 617-20. Olken, Benjamin A. 2010. "Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. American Political Science Review 104(2): 243-67. Greif, Avner. 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition. American Economic Review 83(June): 525-48. Rand, David, Anna Dreber, Tore Ellingsen, Drew Fudenberg, and Martin Nowak. 2009. "Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation. Science 325(5945): 1272-75. Miguel, Edward, and Mary Kay Gugerty. 2005. "Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public Goods in Kenya. Journal of Public Economics 89(11-12): 2325-68. Greif, Avner. 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Rothstein, Bo. 2009. "Creating Political Legitimacy. American Behavioral Scientist 53(3): 311-30. Eguíluz, Víctor M., Martín G. Zimmermann, Camilo J. Cela Conde, and Maxi San Miguel. 2005. "Cooperation and the Emergence of Role Differentiation in the Dynamics of Social Networks. American Journal of Sociology 110(4): 977-1008. King, Andrew J., Dominic D. P. Johnson, and Mark Van Vugt. 2009. "The Origins and Evolution of Leadership. Current Biology 19(19): R911-R916. Hoffmann, Elizabeth A. 2005. "Dispute Resolution in a Worker Cooperative: Formal Procedures and Procedural Justice. Law & Society Review 39(1): 51-82. Fischbacher, Urs, Simon Gächter, and Ernst Fehr. 2001. "Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment. Economics Letters 71: 397-404. Levi, Margaret, Audrey Sacks, and Tom Tyler. 2009. "Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimating Beliefs. American Behavioral Scientist 53(3): 354-75. Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Carpenter, Jeffrey P. 2004. "Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 55(1): 93-99. Gintis, Herbert, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, and Ernst Fehr. 2005. Moral Sentiments and Material Interests. The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life . Cambridge , MA : MIT Press. Lieberman, Evan S. 2007. "Ethnic Politics, Risk, and Policy-Making. Comparative Political Studies 40(12): 1407-32. Berkowitz, Leonard, and Edward Donnerstein. 1982. "External Validity Is More than Skin Deep: Some Answers to Criticisms of Laboratory Experiments. American Psychologist 37(3): 245-57. Dal Bo, Pedro, Andrew Foster, and Louis Putterman. 2010. "Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy. American Economic Review 100(5): 2205-29. Nowak, Martin A. 2006. "Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation. Science 314: 1560-63. Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups . Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press. Laury, Susan K., and Laura O. Taylor. 2008. "Altruism Spillovers: Are Behaviors in Context-Free Experiments Predictive of Altruism toward a Naturally Occurring Public Good?" Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 65(1): 9-29. Gelman, Andrew. 2008. "Scaling Regression Inputs by Dividing by Two Standard Deviations. Statistics in Medicine 27(15): 2865-73. Sigmund, Karl. 2007. "Punish or Perish? Retaliation and Collaboration among Humans. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 22(11): 593-600. Ahlquist, John, and Margaret Levi. 2011. "Leadership: What It Means, What It Does, and What We Want to Know about It. Annual Review of Political Science 14(1): 1-24. Staatz, John M. 1987. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Agricultural Cooperation. Journal of Agricultural Cooperation 2: 74-95. Kullback, S., and R. A. Leibler. 1951. "On Information and Sufficiency. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 22(3): 79-86. Hechter, Michael. 2009. "Legitimacy in the Modern World. American Behavioral Scientist 53(3): 279-88. Dickson, Eric S., Sanford C. Gordon, and Gregory A. Huber. 2009. "Enforcement and Compliance in an Uncertain World: An Experimental Investigation. Journal of Politics 71(4): 1357-78. Murphy, Kristina. 2005. "Regulating More Effectively: The Relationship between Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Tax Non-compliance. Journal of Law and Society 32(4): 562-89. Baldassarri, Delia, and Guy Grossman. 2011. "Centralized Sanctioning and Legitimate Authority Promote Cooperation in Humans. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108(27): 11023-27. Manin, Bernard. 1997. The Principles of Representative Government . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Locke, John. 1990. Second Treatise on Civil Government [1690] . Indianapolis , IN : Hackett. Lubell, Mark, and John T. Scholz. 2001. "Cooperation, Reciprocity, and the Collective-Action Heuristic. American Journal of Political Science 45(1): 160-78. Greif, Avner, Paul Milgrom, and Barry R. Weingast. 1994. "Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild. Journal of Political Economy 102(4): 745-76. Taylor, Michael. 1982. Community, Anarchy, and Liberty . Cambridge , MA : Cambridge University Press. Ostrom, Elinor, James Walker, and Roy Gardner. 1992. "Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible. American Political Science Review 86(2): 404-17. Benz, Matthias, and Stephan Meier. 2008. "Do People Behave in Experiments as in the Field?-Evidence from Donations. Experimental Economics 11(3): 268-81. Boyd, Robert, Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, and Peter J. Richerson. 2003. "The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 100(March): 3531-35. Levi, M., and A. Sacks. 2009. "Legitimating Beliefs: Sources and Indicators. Regulation & Governance 3(4): 311-33. McEwen, Craig A., and Richard J. Maiman. 1986. "In Search of Legitimacy: Toward an Empirical Analysis. Law & Policy 8(3): 257-73. Guth, Werner, M. Vittoria Levati, Matthias Sutter, and Eline van der Heijden. 2007. "Leading by Example with and without Exclusion Power in Voluntary Contribution Experiments. Journal of Public Economics 91(5-6): 1023-42. de Rooij, Eline A., Donald P. Green, and Alan S. Gerber. 2009. "Field Experiments on Political Behavior and Collective Action. Annual Review of Political Science 12(May): 389-95. Scholz, John T., and Wayne B. Gray. 1997. "Can Government Facilitate Cooperation? An Informational Model of OSHA Enforcement. American Journal of Political Science 41(3): 693-717. Burnham, Terence C., and Dominic Johnson. 2005. "The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation. Analyse & Kritik 27(2): 113-35. Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter. 2002. "Altruistic Punishment in Humans. Nature 415(6868): 137-40. List, John A. 2006. "The Behavioralist Meets the Market: Measuring Social Preferences and Reputation Effects in Actual Transactions. Journal of Political Economy 114(1): 1-37. Fowler, James H. 2005. "Human Cooperation: Second-Order Free-Riding Problem Solved?" Nature 437(7058): E8. Dewan, Torun, and David P. Myatt. 2008. "The Qualities of Leadership: Direction, Communication, and Obfuscation. American Political Science Review 102(3): 351-68. Fearon, James D., Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2009. "Can Development Aid Contribute to Social Cohesion after Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Post-Conflict Liberia. American Economic Review 99(2): 287-91. O'Gorman, Rick, Joseph Henrich, and Mark Van Vugt. 2009. "Constraining Free Riding in Public Goods Games: Designated Solitary Punishers Can Sustain Human Cooperation. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 276(1655): 323-29. Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, and Herbert Gintis. 2004. Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies . Oxford : Oxford University Press. Narayan-Parker, Deepa. 2002. Empowerment and Poverty Reduction: A Sourcebook . Washington , DC : World Bank. Levitsky, Steven, and M. Victoria Murillo. 2009. "Variation in Institutional Strength: Causes and Implications. Annual Review of Political Science 12: 115-33. Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice . Cambridge , MA : Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Hopfensitz, Astrid, and Ernesto Reuben. 2009. "The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment. The Economic Journal 119(540): 1534-59. Wilson, Rick K., and Carl M. Rhodes. 1997. "Leadership and Credibility in N-Person Coordination Games. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(6): 767-91. Casari, Marco, and Luigi Luini. 2009. "Cooperation under Alternative Punishment Institutions: An Experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71(2): 273-82. Erikson, Emily, and Joseph M. Parent. 2007. "Central Authority and Order. Sociological Theory 25(3): 245-67. Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" American Political Science Review 101(4): 709-25. Weber, Max. [1978] 1922. Economy and Society . Berkeley : University of California Press. Huber, Gregory A., and Sanford C. Gordon. 2004. "Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office? American Journal of Political Science 48(2): 247-63. Levitt, Steven D., and John A. List. 2007. "What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal about the Real World?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(2): 153-74. Levati, M. Vittoria, Matthias Sutter, and Eline van der Heijden. 2007. "Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information. Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(5): 793-818. Zelditch, Morris. 2001. "Processes of Legitimation: Recent Developments and New Directions. Social Psychology Quarterly 64(March): 4-17. Cardenas, Juan Camilo, and Jeffrey Carpenter. 2008. 2010; 12 2007; 101 1987; 2 1997; 41 2010; 104 2009; 276 1951; 22 1971 2011; 14 2008; 102 2005; 27 2009; 119 2001; 45 2009; 12 2009; 99 1994; 102 2009; 53 2001 1990 1986; 8 2008; 27 2005; 32 2008; 65 1982 1992; 86 2009; 19 2007; 21 2005; 39 2007; 22 2007; 25 2009; 325 2001; 71 1982; 37 2006; 96 2010; 38 2012 2005; 110 2010; 328 1993; 83 2011 2010 2004; 48 2009 2005; 437 2002; 415 1997 2007; 91 1996 2006 2005 2008; 11 2004 2003 2007; 51 2002 2001; 22 2006; 314 2005; 89 2006; 114 2001; 64 2004; 55 2011; 108 2009; 71 1965 2008; 44 2007; 40 2009; 3 2003; 100 2005; 58 1922 e_1_2_9_75_1 e_1_2_9_52_1 e_1_2_9_50_1 e_1_2_9_73_1 e_1_2_9_79_1 e_1_2_9_10_1 e_1_2_9_35_1 e_1_2_9_56_1 e_1_2_9_77_1 e_1_2_9_33_1 e_1_2_9_54_1 Greif Avner (e_1_2_9_31_1) 1993; 83 e_1_2_9_71_1 e_1_2_9_14_1 e_1_2_9_39_1 e_1_2_9_37_1 Camerer Colin (e_1_2_9_12_1) 2003 e_1_2_9_18_1 e_1_2_9_41_1 e_1_2_9_64_1 Baldassarri Delia (e_1_2_9_3_1) 2009 e_1_2_9_20_1 e_1_2_9_62_1 e_1_2_9_22_1 e_1_2_9_45_1 e_1_2_9_68_1 e_1_2_9_24_1 e_1_2_9_43_1 e_1_2_9_66_1 e_1_2_9_8_1 e_1_2_9_6_1 e_1_2_9_81_1 e_1_2_9_4_1 e_1_2_9_60_1 e_1_2_9_2_1 Weber Max (e_1_2_9_80_1) 1922 e_1_2_9_26_1 e_1_2_9_49_1 e_1_2_9_28_1 e_1_2_9_47_1 e_1_2_9_30_1 e_1_2_9_53_1 e_1_2_9_74_1 e_1_2_9_51_1 e_1_2_9_72_1 e_1_2_9_34_1 e_1_2_9_57_1 e_1_2_9_13_1 e_1_2_9_32_1 e_1_2_9_55_1 e_1_2_9_76_1 Olson Mancur (e_1_2_9_70_1) 1965 e_1_2_9_15_1 e_1_2_9_38_1 e_1_2_9_17_1 e_1_2_9_36_1 e_1_2_9_59_1 e_1_2_9_19_1 Dal Bo Pedro (e_1_2_9_16_1) 2010 e_1_2_9_42_1 e_1_2_9_63_1 e_1_2_9_40_1 e_1_2_9_61_1 e_1_2_9_21_1 e_1_2_9_46_1 e_1_2_9_67_1 e_1_2_9_23_1 e_1_2_9_44_1 e_1_2_9_65_1 e_1_2_9_7_1 e_1_2_9_5_1 e_1_2_9_82_1 Locke John (e_1_2_9_58_1) 1990 e_1_2_9_9_1 Burnham Terence C. (e_1_2_9_11_1) 2005; 27 e_1_2_9_25_1 Staatz John M (e_1_2_9_78_1) 1987; 2 e_1_2_9_27_1 e_1_2_9_48_1 e_1_2_9_69_1 e_1_2_9_29_1 11805825 - Nature. 2002 Jan 10;415(6868):137-40 18812292 - Proc Biol Sci. 2009 Jan 22;276(1655):323-9 17158317 - Science. 2006 Dec 8;314(5805):1560-3 20431013 - Science. 2010 Apr 30;328(5978):617-20 21690401 - Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2011 Jul 5;108(27):11023-7 17960576 - Stat Med. 2008 Jul 10;27(15):2865-73 12631700 - Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2003 Mar 18;100(6):3531-5 19729661 - Science. 2009 Sep 4;325(5945):1272-5 19825357 - Curr Biol. 2009 Oct 13;19(19):R911-6 16177738 - Nature. 2005 Sep 22;437(7058):E8; discussion E8-9 17963994 - Trends Ecol Evol. 2007 Nov;22(11):593-600 11384884 - Evol Hum Behav. 2001 May;22(3):165-196 25076785 - Am Econ Rev. 2010 Dec;100(5):2205-2229 |
| References_xml | – reference: Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice . Cambridge , MA : Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. – reference: Taylor, Michael. 1982. Community, Anarchy, and Liberty . Cambridge , MA : Cambridge University Press. – reference: Weber, Max. [1978] 1922. Economy and Society . Berkeley : University of California Press. – reference: Carpenter, Jeffrey P. 2004. "Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 55(1): 93-99. – reference: Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. – reference: Gelman, Andrew. 2008. "Scaling Regression Inputs by Dividing by Two Standard Deviations. Statistics in Medicine 27(15): 2865-73. – reference: Staatz, John M. 1987. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Agricultural Cooperation. Journal of Agricultural Cooperation 2: 74-95. – reference: Linz, Juan J., and Alfred C. Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe . Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press. – reference: Dickson, Eric S., Sanford C. Gordon, and Gregory A. Huber. 2009. "Enforcement and Compliance in an Uncertain World: An Experimental Investigation. Journal of Politics 71(4): 1357-78. – reference: O'Gorman, Rick, Joseph Henrich, and Mark Van Vugt. 2009. "Constraining Free Riding in Public Goods Games: Designated Solitary Punishers Can Sustain Human Cooperation. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 276(1655): 323-29. – reference: Guth, Werner, M. Vittoria Levati, Matthias Sutter, and Eline van der Heijden. 2007. "Leading by Example with and without Exclusion Power in Voluntary Contribution Experiments. Journal of Public Economics 91(5-6): 1023-42. – reference: Morton, Rebecca B., and Kenneth C. Williams. 2010. Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality: From Nature to the Lab . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. – reference: Ahlquist, John, and Margaret Levi. 2011. "Leadership: What It Means, What It Does, and What We Want to Know about It. Annual Review of Political Science 14(1): 1-24. – reference: Lieberman, Evan S. 2007. "Ethnic Politics, Risk, and Policy-Making. Comparative Political Studies 40(12): 1407-32. – reference: Wilson, Rick K., and Carl M. Rhodes. 1997. "Leadership and Credibility in N-Person Coordination Games. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(6): 767-91. – reference: Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter. 2002. "Altruistic Punishment in Humans. Nature 415(6868): 137-40. – reference: Berkowitz, Leonard, and Edward Donnerstein. 1982. "External Validity Is More than Skin Deep: Some Answers to Criticisms of Laboratory Experiments. American Psychologist 37(3): 245-57. – reference: Rothstein, Bo. 2009. "Creating Political Legitimacy. American Behavioral Scientist 53(3): 311-30. – reference: Laury, Susan K., and Laura O. Taylor. 2008. "Altruism Spillovers: Are Behaviors in Context-Free Experiments Predictive of Altruism toward a Naturally Occurring Public Good?" Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 65(1): 9-29. – reference: Dewan, Torun, and David P. Myatt. 2008. "The Qualities of Leadership: Direction, Communication, and Obfuscation. American Political Science Review 102(3): 351-68. – reference: Zelditch, Morris. 2001. "Processes of Legitimation: Recent Developments and New Directions. Social Psychology Quarterly 64(March): 4-17. – reference: Huber, Gregory A., and Sanford C. Gordon. 2004. "Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office? American Journal of Political Science 48(2): 247-63. – reference: Murphy, Kristina. 2005. "Regulating More Effectively: The Relationship between Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Tax Non-compliance. Journal of Law and Society 32(4): 562-89. – reference: Fowler, James H. 2005. "Human Cooperation: Second-Order Free-Riding Problem Solved?" Nature 437(7058): E8. – reference: Greif, Avner. 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. – reference: Baldassarri, Delia, and Guy Grossman. 2011. "Centralized Sanctioning and Legitimate Authority Promote Cooperation in Humans. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108(27): 11023-27. – reference: Greif, Avner. 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition. American Economic Review 83(June): 525-48. – reference: Cardenas, Juan Camilo, and Jeffrey Carpenter. 2008. "Behavioural Development Economics: Lessons from Field Labs in the Developing World. Journal of Development Studies 44(3): 311-38. – reference: Lubell, Mark, and John T. Scholz. 2001. "Cooperation, Reciprocity, and the Collective-Action Heuristic. American Journal of Political Science 45(1): 160-78. – reference: Fischbacher, Urs, Simon Gächter, and Ernst Fehr. 2001. "Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment. Economics Letters 71: 397-404. – reference: Levati, M. Vittoria, Matthias Sutter, and Eline van der Heijden. 2007. "Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information. Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(5): 793-818. – reference: Erikson, Emily, and Joseph M. Parent. 2007. "Central Authority and Order. Sociological Theory 25(3): 245-67. – reference: Nowak, Martin A. 2006. "Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation. Science 314: 1560-63. – reference: Casari, Marco, and Luigi Luini. 2009. "Cooperation under Alternative Punishment Institutions: An Experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71(2): 273-82. – reference: Narayan-Parker, Deepa. 2002. Empowerment and Poverty Reduction: A Sourcebook . Washington , DC : World Bank. – reference: Greif, Avner, Paul Milgrom, and Barry R. Weingast. 1994. "Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild. Journal of Political Economy 102(4): 745-76. – reference: Hoffmann, Elizabeth A. 2005. "Dispute Resolution in a Worker Cooperative: Formal Procedures and Procedural Justice. Law & Society Review 39(1): 51-82. – reference: Kullback, S., and R. A. Leibler. 1951. "On Information and Sufficiency. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 22(3): 79-86. – reference: Levi, Margaret, Audrey Sacks, and Tom Tyler. 2009. "Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimating Beliefs. American Behavioral Scientist 53(3): 354-75. – reference: Camerer, Colin. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction . New York : Russell Sage Foundation. – reference: Locke, John. 1990. Second Treatise on Civil Government [1690] . Indianapolis , IN : Hackett. – reference: Goette, Lorenz, David Huffman, and Stephan Meier. 2006. "The Impact of Group Membership on Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: Evidence Using Random Assignment to Real Social Groups. American Economic Review 96(May): 212-16. – reference: Manin, Bernard. 1997. The Principles of Representative Government . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. – reference: Dal Bo, Pedro, Andrew Foster, and Louis Putterman. 2010. "Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy. American Economic Review 100(5): 2205-29. – reference: King, Andrew J., Dominic D. P. Johnson, and Mark Van Vugt. 2009. "The Origins and Evolution of Leadership. Current Biology 19(19): R911-R916. – reference: McEwen, Craig A., and Richard J. Maiman. 1986. "In Search of Legitimacy: Toward an Empirical Analysis. Law & Policy 8(3): 257-73. – reference: Gintis, Herbert, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, and Ernst Fehr. 2005. Moral Sentiments and Material Interests. The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life . Cambridge , MA : MIT Press. – reference: Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" American Political Science Review 101(4): 709-25. – reference: Fearon, James D., Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2009. "Can Development Aid Contribute to Social Cohesion after Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Post-Conflict Liberia. American Economic Review 99(2): 287-91. – reference: Benz, Matthias, and Stephan Meier. 2008. "Do People Behave in Experiments as in the Field?-Evidence from Donations. Experimental Economics 11(3): 268-81. – reference: Eckel, Catherine C., Enrique Fatas, and Rick Wilson. 2010. "Cooperation and Status in Organizations. Journal of Public Economic Theory 12(4): 737-62. – reference: Hechter, Michael. 2009. "Legitimacy in the Modern World. American Behavioral Scientist 53(3): 279-88. – reference: Boyd, Robert, Herbert Gintis, and Samuel Bowles. 2010. "Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare. Science 328: 617-20. – reference: List, John A. 2006. "The Behavioralist Meets the Market: Measuring Social Preferences and Reputation Effects in Actual Transactions. Journal of Political Economy 114(1): 1-37. – reference: Rand, David, Anna Dreber, Tore Ellingsen, Drew Fudenberg, and Martin Nowak. 2009. "Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation. Science 325(5945): 1272-75. – reference: Levi, Margaret. 1997. Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. – reference: Scholz, John T., and Wayne B. Gray. 1997. "Can Government Facilitate Cooperation? An Informational Model of OSHA Enforcement. American Journal of Political Science 41(3): 693-717. – reference: Greif, Avner, and Steven Tadelis. 2010. "A Theory of Moral Persistence: Crypto-Morality and Political Legitimacy. Journal of Comparative Economics 38: 229-44. – reference: Eguíluz, Víctor M., Martín G. Zimmermann, Camilo J. Cela Conde, and Maxi San Miguel. 2005. "Cooperation and the Emergence of Role Differentiation in the Dynamics of Social Networks. American Journal of Sociology 110(4): 977-1008. – reference: Olken, Benjamin A. 2010. "Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. American Political Science Review 104(2): 243-67. – reference: Burnham, Terence C., and Dominic Johnson. 2005. "The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation. Analyse & Kritik 27(2): 113-35. – reference: Levitsky, Steven, and M. Victoria Murillo. 2009. "Variation in Institutional Strength: Causes and Implications. Annual Review of Political Science 12: 115-33. – reference: Hibbing, John R., and John R. Alford. 2004. "Accepting Authoritative Decisions: Humans as Wary Cooperators. American Journal of Political Science 48(1): 62-76. – reference: Miguel, Edward, and Mary Kay Gugerty. 2005. "Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public Goods in Kenya. Journal of Public Economics 89(11-12): 2325-68. – reference: de Rooij, Eline A., Donald P. Green, and Alan S. Gerber. 2009. "Field Experiments on Political Behavior and Collective Action. Annual Review of Political Science 12(May): 389-95. – reference: Ostrom, Elinor, James Walker, and Roy Gardner. 1992. "Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible. American Political Science Review 86(2): 404-17. – reference: Hopfensitz, Astrid, and Ernesto Reuben. 2009. "The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment. The Economic Journal 119(540): 1534-59. – reference: Gibson, James L., Gregory A. Caldeira, and Lester Kenyatta Spence. 2005. "Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment. Political Research Quarterly 58(June): 187-201. – reference: Boyd, Robert, Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, and Peter J. Richerson. 2003. "The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 100(March): 3531-35. – reference: Sigmund, Karl. 2007. "Punish or Perish? Retaliation and Collaboration among Humans. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 22(11): 593-600. – reference: Levi, M., and A. Sacks. 2009. "Legitimating Beliefs: Sources and Indicators. Regulation & Governance 3(4): 311-33. – reference: Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, and Herbert Gintis. 2004. Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies . Oxford : Oxford University Press. – reference: Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups . Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press. – reference: Levitt, Steven D., and John A. List. 2007. "What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal about the Real World?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(2): 153-74. – year: 2011 – volume: 45 start-page: 160 issue: 1 year: 2001 end-page: 78 article-title: Cooperation, Reciprocity, and the Collective‐Action Heuristic publication-title: American Journal of Political Science – volume: 100 start-page: 3531 year: 2003 end-page: 35 article-title: The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment publication-title: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America – year: 2005 – volume: 110 start-page: 977 issue: 4 year: 2005 end-page: 1008 article-title: Cooperation and the Emergence of Role Differentiation in the Dynamics of Social Networks publication-title: American Journal of Sociology – start-page: 391 year: 2009 end-page: 418 – year: 2001 – volume: 71 start-page: 1357 issue: 4 year: 2009 end-page: 78 article-title: Enforcement and Compliance in an Uncertain World: An Experimental Investigation publication-title: Journal of Politics – volume: 91 start-page: 1023 issue: 5–6 year: 2007 end-page: 42 article-title: Leading by Example with and without Exclusion Power in Voluntary Contribution Experiments publication-title: Journal of Public Economics – volume: 325 start-page: 1272 issue: 5945 year: 2009 end-page: 75 article-title: Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation publication-title: Science – volume: 53 start-page: 311 issue: 3 year: 2009 end-page: 30 article-title: Creating Political Legitimacy publication-title: American Behavioral Scientist – volume: 32 start-page: 562 issue: 4 year: 2005 end-page: 89 article-title: Regulating More Effectively: The Relationship between Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Tax Non‐compliance publication-title: Journal of Law and Society – volume: 101 start-page: 709 issue: 4 year: 2007 end-page: 25 article-title: Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision publication-title: American Political Science Review – volume: 22 start-page: 165 issue: 3 year: 2001 end-page: 96 – volume: 22 start-page: 593 issue: 11 year: 2007 end-page: 600 article-title: Punish or Perish? Retaliation and Collaboration among Humans publication-title: Trends in Ecology & Evolution – year: 1971 – volume: 71 start-page: 397 year: 2001 end-page: 404 article-title: Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment publication-title: Economics Letters – year: 1990 – volume: 86 start-page: 404 issue: 2 year: 1992 end-page: 17 article-title: Covenants with and without a Sword: Self‐Governance Is Possible publication-title: American Political Science Review – volume: 64 start-page: 4 year: 2001 end-page: 17 article-title: Processes of Legitimation: Recent Developments and New Directions publication-title: Social Psychology Quarterly – volume: 71 start-page: 273 issue: 2 year: 2009 end-page: 82 article-title: Cooperation under Alternative Punishment Institutions: An Experiment publication-title: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization – volume: 48 start-page: 62 issue: 1 year: 2004 end-page: 76 article-title: Accepting Authoritative Decisions: Humans as Wary Cooperators publication-title: American Journal of Political Science – volume: 276 start-page: 323 issue: 1655 year: 2009 end-page: 29 article-title: Constraining Free Riding in Public Goods Games: Designated Solitary Punishers Can Sustain Human Cooperation publication-title: Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences – year: 1982 – volume: 41 start-page: 693 issue: 3 year: 1997 end-page: 717 article-title: Can Government Facilitate Cooperation? An Informational Model of OSHA Enforcement publication-title: American Journal of Political Science – volume: 114 start-page: 1 issue: 1 year: 2006 end-page: 37 article-title: The Behavioralist Meets the Market: Measuring Social Preferences and Reputation Effects in Actual Transactions publication-title: Journal of Political Economy – volume: 328 start-page: 617 year: 2010 end-page: 20 article-title: Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare publication-title: Science – volume: 40 start-page: 1407 issue: 12 year: 2007 end-page: 32 article-title: Ethnic Politics, Risk, and Policy‐Making publication-title: Comparative Political Studies – year: 1965 – volume: 38 start-page: 229 year: 2010 end-page: 44 article-title: A Theory of Moral Persistence: Crypto‐Morality and Political Legitimacy publication-title: Journal of Comparative Economics – volume: 99 start-page: 287 issue: 2 year: 2009 end-page: 91 article-title: Can Development Aid Contribute to Social Cohesion after Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Post‐Conflict Liberia publication-title: American Economic Review – year: 2004 – volume: 48 start-page: 247 issue: 2 year: 2004 end-page: 63 article-title: Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office? publication-title: American Journal of Political Science – year: 1997 – volume: 102 start-page: 351 issue: 3 year: 2008 end-page: 68 article-title: The Qualities of Leadership: Direction, Communication, and Obfuscation publication-title: American Political Science Review – volume: 44 start-page: 311 issue: 3 year: 2008 end-page: 38 article-title: Behavioural Development Economics: Lessons from Field Labs in the Developing World publication-title: Journal of Development Studies – volume: 65 start-page: 9 issue: 1 year: 2008 end-page: 29 article-title: Altruism Spillovers: Are Behaviors in Context‐Free Experiments Predictive of Altruism toward a Naturally Occurring Public Good publication-title: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization – volume: 12 start-page: 737 issue: 4 year: 2010 end-page: 62 article-title: Cooperation and Status in Organizations publication-title: Journal of Public Economic Theory – volume: 104 start-page: 243 issue: 2 year: 2010 end-page: 67 article-title: Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia publication-title: American Political Science Review – volume: 37 start-page: 245 issue: 3 year: 1982 end-page: 57 article-title: External Validity Is More than Skin Deep: Some Answers to Criticisms of Laboratory Experiments publication-title: American Psychologist – volume: 8 start-page: 257 issue: 3 year: 1986 end-page: 73 article-title: In Search of Legitimacy: Toward an Empirical Analysis publication-title: Law & Policy – volume: 12 start-page: 115 year: 2009 end-page: 33 article-title: Variation in Institutional Strength: Causes and Implications publication-title: Annual Review of Political Science – volume: 102 start-page: 745 issue: 4 year: 1994 end-page: 76 article-title: Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild publication-title: Journal of Political Economy – volume: 314 start-page: 1560 year: 2006 end-page: 63 article-title: Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation publication-title: Science – volume: 437 start-page: E8 issue: 7058 year: 2005 article-title: Human Cooperation: Second‐Order Free‐Riding Problem Solved publication-title: Nature – volume: 89 start-page: 2325 issue: 11–12 year: 2005 end-page: 68 article-title: Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public Goods in Kenya publication-title: Journal of Public Economics – year: 2003 – start-page: 389 year: 2009 end-page: 95 article-title: Field Experiments on Political Behavior and Collective Action publication-title: Annual Review of Political Science – year: 1996 – volume: 58 start-page: 187 year: 2005 end-page: 201 article-title: Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey‐Based Experiment publication-title: Political Research Quarterly – volume: 53 start-page: 354 issue: 3 year: 2009 end-page: 75 article-title: Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimating Beliefs publication-title: American Behavioral Scientist – volume: 11 start-page: 268 issue: 3 year: 2008 end-page: 81 article-title: Do People Behave in Experiments as in the Field?—Evidence from Donations publication-title: Experimental Economics – volume: 108 start-page: 11023 issue: 27 year: 2011 end-page: 27 article-title: Centralized Sanctioning and Legitimate Authority Promote Cooperation in Humans publication-title: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences – volume: 27 start-page: 2865 issue: 15 year: 2008 end-page: 73 article-title: Scaling Regression Inputs by Dividing by Two Standard Deviations publication-title: Statistics in Medicine – volume: 27 start-page: 113 issue: 2 year: 2005 end-page: 35 article-title: The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation publication-title: Analyse & Kritik – volume: 22 start-page: 79 issue: 3 year: 1951 end-page: 86 article-title: On Information and Sufficiency publication-title: Annals of Mathematical Statistics – year: 2010 – year: 2012 – start-page: 100 issue: 5 year: 2010 end-page: 29 article-title: Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy publication-title: American Economic Review – volume: 55 start-page: 93 issue: 1 year: 2004 end-page: 99 article-title: Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research publication-title: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization – volume: 25 start-page: 245 issue: 3 year: 2007 end-page: 67 article-title: Central Authority and Order publication-title: Sociological Theory – volume: 83 start-page: 525 year: 1993 end-page: 48 article-title: Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition publication-title: American Economic Review – volume: 41 start-page: 767 issue: 6 year: 1997 end-page: 91 article-title: Leadership and Credibility in N‐Person Coordination Games publication-title: Journal of Conflict Resolution – volume: 415 start-page: 137 issue: 6868 year: 2002 end-page: 40 article-title: Altruistic Punishment in Humans publication-title: Nature – volume: 96 start-page: 212 year: 2006 end-page: 16 article-title: The Impact of Group Membership on Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: Evidence Using Random Assignment to Real Social Groups publication-title: American Economic Review – volume: 3 start-page: 311 issue: 4 year: 2009 end-page: 33 article-title: Legitimating Beliefs: Sources and Indicators publication-title: Regulation & Governance – volume: 2 start-page: 74 year: 1987 end-page: 95 article-title: Recent Developments in the Theory of Agricultural Cooperation publication-title: Journal of Agricultural Cooperation – volume: 53 start-page: 279 issue: 3 year: 2009 end-page: 88 article-title: Legitimacy in the Modern World publication-title: American Behavioral Scientist – volume: 39 start-page: 51 issue: 1 year: 2005 end-page: 82 article-title: Dispute Resolution in a Worker Cooperative: Formal Procedures and Procedural Justice publication-title: Law & Society Review – year: 2002 – year: 2006 – year: 1922 – volume: 51 start-page: 793 issue: 5 year: 2007 end-page: 818 article-title: Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information publication-title: Journal of Conflict Resolution – volume: 14 start-page: 1 issue: 1 year: 2011 end-page: 24 article-title: Leadership: What It Means, What It Does, and What We Want to Know about It publication-title: Annual Review of Political Science – volume: 21 start-page: 153 issue: 2 year: 2007 end-page: 74 article-title: What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal about the Real World publication-title: Journal of Economic Perspectives – volume: 19 start-page: R911 issue: 19 year: 2009 end-page: R916 article-title: The Origins and Evolution of Leadership publication-title: Current Biology – volume: 119 start-page: 1534 issue: 540 year: 2009 end-page: 59 article-title: The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment publication-title: The Economic Journal – volume: 2 start-page: 74 year: 1987 ident: e_1_2_9_78_1 article-title: Recent Developments in the Theory of Agricultural Cooperation publication-title: Journal of Agricultural Cooperation – start-page: 391 volume-title: The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology year: 2009 ident: e_1_2_9_3_1 – ident: e_1_2_9_43_1 doi: 10.1111/j.0023-9216.2005.00077.x – ident: e_1_2_9_56_1 doi: 10.56021/9780801851575 – ident: e_1_2_9_77_1 doi: 10.1016/j.tree.2007.06.012 – ident: e_1_2_9_40_1 doi: 10.1093/0199262055.001.0001 – ident: e_1_2_9_53_1 doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.091106.121756 – ident: e_1_2_9_36_1 doi: 10.2139/ssrn.1903119 – ident: e_1_2_9_49_1 doi: 10.1177/0022002707302796 – ident: e_1_2_9_34_1 doi: 10.1016/j.jce.2010.07.005 – ident: e_1_2_9_25_1 doi: 10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00394-9 – ident: e_1_2_9_62_1 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9930.1986.tb00380.x – volume: 27 start-page: 113 issue: 2 year: 2005 ident: e_1_2_9_11_1 article-title: The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation publication-title: Analyse & Kritik doi: 10.1515/auk-2005-0107 – ident: e_1_2_9_63_1 doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.09.004 – ident: e_1_2_9_66_1 doi: 10.1596/0-8213-5166-4 – ident: e_1_2_9_41_1 doi: 10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00071-4 – ident: e_1_2_9_18_1 doi: 10.1017/S0003055408080234 – start-page: 100 issue: 5 year: 2010 ident: e_1_2_9_16_1 article-title: Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy publication-title: American Economic Review – ident: e_1_2_9_44_1 doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02288.x – ident: e_1_2_9_50_1 doi: 10.1111/j.1748-5991.2009.01066.x – ident: e_1_2_9_20_1 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01472.x – ident: e_1_2_9_51_1 doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511609336 – ident: e_1_2_9_67_1 doi: 10.1126/science.1133755 – ident: e_1_2_9_37_1 doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.10.007 – ident: e_1_2_9_8_1 doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.37.3.245 – ident: e_1_2_9_38_1 doi: 10.1017/S0003055407070499 – volume-title: Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction year: 2003 ident: e_1_2_9_12_1 – ident: e_1_2_9_15_1 doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.022 – ident: e_1_2_9_17_1 doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.060107.154037 – ident: e_1_2_9_74_1 doi: 10.4159/9780674042605 – ident: e_1_2_9_14_1 doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.07.005 – ident: e_1_2_9_65_1 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6478.2005.00338.x – ident: e_1_2_9_28_1 doi: 10.1177/106591290505800201 – ident: e_1_2_9_35_1 – ident: e_1_2_9_5_1 – volume: 83 start-page: 525 year: 1993 ident: e_1_2_9_31_1 article-title: Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition publication-title: American Economic Review – ident: e_1_2_9_39_1 doi: 10.1177/0002764209338793 – ident: e_1_2_9_47_1 doi: 10.1214/aoms/1177729694 – ident: e_1_2_9_59_1 doi: 10.2307/2669365 – ident: e_1_2_9_68_1 doi: 10.1098/rspb.2008.1082 – ident: e_1_2_9_55_1 doi: 10.1177/0010414007306862 – ident: e_1_2_9_26_1 doi: 10.1038/nature04201 – ident: e_1_2_9_10_1 doi: 10.1073/pnas.0630443100 – volume-title: The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups year: 1965 ident: e_1_2_9_70_1 doi: 10.4159/9780674041660 – ident: e_1_2_9_27_1 doi: 10.1002/sim.3107 – ident: e_1_2_9_79_1 doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511607875 – ident: e_1_2_9_22_1 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9558.2007.00307.x – ident: e_1_2_9_6_1 – ident: e_1_2_9_82_1 doi: 10.2307/3090147 – ident: e_1_2_9_45_1 doi: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00068.x – ident: e_1_2_9_13_1 doi: 10.1080/00220380701848327 – ident: e_1_2_9_19_1 doi: 10.1017/S0022381609990235 – ident: e_1_2_9_64_1 doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511762888 – ident: e_1_2_9_4_1 doi: 10.1073/pnas.1105456108 – ident: e_1_2_9_72_1 doi: 10.2307/1964229 – ident: e_1_2_9_24_1 doi: 10.1038/415137a – volume-title: Economy and Society year: 1922 ident: e_1_2_9_80_1 – ident: e_1_2_9_29_1 doi: 10.7551/mitpress/4771.001.0001 – ident: e_1_2_9_71_1 doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511807763 – ident: e_1_2_9_23_1 doi: 10.1257/aer.99.2.287 – ident: e_1_2_9_9_1 doi: 10.1126/science.1183665 – ident: e_1_2_9_54_1 doi: 10.1257/jep.21.2.153 – ident: e_1_2_9_33_1 doi: 10.1086/261953 – ident: e_1_2_9_21_1 doi: 10.1086/428716 – ident: e_1_2_9_32_1 doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511791307 – ident: e_1_2_9_60_1 doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511659935 – ident: e_1_2_9_46_1 doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2009.07.027 – ident: e_1_2_9_75_1 doi: 10.1177/0002764209338795 – ident: e_1_2_9_42_1 doi: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00056.x – ident: e_1_2_9_73_1 doi: 10.1126/science.1177418 – ident: e_1_2_9_76_1 doi: 10.2307/2111672 – ident: e_1_2_9_48_1 doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.011 – ident: e_1_2_9_2_1 doi: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-042409-152654 – ident: e_1_2_9_30_1 doi: 10.1257/000282806777211658 – ident: e_1_2_9_69_1 doi: 10.1017/S0003055410000079 – ident: e_1_2_9_52_1 doi: 10.1177/0002764209338797 – ident: e_1_2_9_81_1 doi: 10.1177/0022002797041006003 – ident: e_1_2_9_7_1 doi: 10.1007/s10683-007-9192-y – ident: e_1_2_9_61_1 – volume-title: Second Treatise on Civil Government [1690] year: 1990 ident: e_1_2_9_58_1 – ident: e_1_2_9_57_1 doi: 10.1086/498587 – reference: 16177738 - Nature. 2005 Sep 22;437(7058):E8; discussion E8-9 – reference: 19729661 - Science. 2009 Sep 4;325(5945):1272-5 – reference: 17158317 - Science. 2006 Dec 8;314(5805):1560-3 – reference: 17963994 - Trends Ecol Evol. 2007 Nov;22(11):593-600 – reference: 25076785 - Am Econ Rev. 2010 Dec;100(5):2205-2229 – reference: 19825357 - Curr Biol. 2009 Oct 13;19(19):R911-6 – reference: 21690401 - Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2011 Jul 5;108(27):11023-7 – reference: 17960576 - Stat Med. 2008 Jul 10;27(15):2865-73 – reference: 11384884 - Evol Hum Behav. 2001 May;22(3):165-196 – reference: 11805825 - Nature. 2002 Jan 10;415(6868):137-40 – reference: 12631700 - Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2003 Mar 18;100(6):3531-5 – reference: 18812292 - Proc Biol Sci. 2009 Jan 22;276(1655):323-9 – reference: 20431013 - Science. 2010 Apr 30;328(5978):617-20 |
| SSID | ssj0009493 |
| Score | 2.4151044 |
| Snippet | Communities often rely on sanctioning to induce public goods contributions. Past studies focus on how external agencies or peer sanctioning induce cooperation.... |
| SourceID | pubmedcentral proquest pubmed crossref wiley jstor istex |
| SourceType | Open Access Repository Aggregation Database Index Database Enrichment Source Publisher |
| StartPage | 964 |
| SubjectTerms | Agricultural cooperatives Agricultural management Campaign contributions Collective farms Community Community Structure Cooperation Democratic authority Dilemmas Elections Endowments Experiments Farmers Lotteries Natural environment Political behavior Political processes Political science Public Goods Research design Subordination Uganda |
| Title | The Impact of Elections on Cooperation: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Uganda |
| URI | https://api.istex.fr/ark:/67375/WNG-XS9NBJ54-N/fulltext.pdf https://www.jstor.org/stable/23317168 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111%2Fj.1540-5907.2012.00596.x https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23729913 https://www.proquest.com/docview/1082300610 https://www.proquest.com/docview/1124749851 https://www.proquest.com/docview/1567042241 https://www.proquest.com/docview/1826585733 https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/PMC3666592 |
| Volume | 56 |
| hasFullText | 1 |
| inHoldings | 1 |
| isFullTextHit | |
| isPrint | |
| link | http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwrV1LbxMxELZQuXCB8igsFGQkxG2j3dj7cG-lSigRRIgSkZtl79oQpfJWTSJVPfET-I38Ema8D7JQVRXisopiT7SZHY-_8X7-TMiryPLMpgVUJ3E5DLnOWKhEGoclPOxMKMCkBtc7PkzT4xmfzJN5w3_CvTC1PkS34IYjw-drHOBKr_qDHF_qJ1DdIUMLdTcTkQ4QTyJ1C_HRp99KUoI3-rsCai-Yovqknit_qDdT3UanX7Skxavg6N-sym2066er8T2ybP9ozVJZDjZrPSgu_9CA_D-e2CV3G1RLD-swvE9uGfeA7DbcOmhoMshDUkBY0nd-ZyatLB2deiaYW9HK0aOqOjN1QB7Q9rRTivtfqKLvlf75_cfCwQUgK1zHSL2jo-6AArpwdPYV10Uekdl49PnoOGzOeQgLyBdpCCkiZyaKbWGYLXMbMQU4iOeWG8FtbBQXEbM21pAucsWLnBuTM25ZoQXUQxHbIzuucuYJ7kBHtR01FFkJUCuOhQVDHdk00WlpNQtI1j5TWTQi6HgWx6ncKobAmRKdKdGZ0jtTXgQk7izPaiGQG9i89mHTGajzJRLpskR-mb6V8xMxfTNJuJwGZM_HVddxyBjqGOUB2W8DTTbJZYWarlA4AhCLAvKya4a0gO96lDPVBvoAbsu4ADx9TZ8kzVACjl_XB8pPGC8ZA9c9ruN76yahMhMxOrUX-V0HlC7vt7jFNy9hzqBqTsQwIKkP7Bt7VB5OPp7Ap6f_aviM3MGvazrmPtlZn2_Mc4CVa_3CJ4xfxiVokA |
| linkProvider | Wiley-Blackwell |
| linkToHtml | http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwrV1Lb9NAEF6h9gAXKI-CocAiIW6O7Oz6sdxKlTQNqYVoI3Jbre1diBrZVZtIFaf-hP5Gfgkz60djqKoKcbEi7YzljGdnv1nPfkPIe8_wyIQZZCd-3nd5GjFXidB3c3jZkVCASTXudxwm4WjKx7NgVrcDwrMwFT9Eu-GGM8PGa5zguCHdneX4VT-A9A5LtJB4MxBhDwDlJjb4tvnV12suKcFrBl4B2RcsUt2ynhvv1FmrNtHsF03Z4k2A9O-6ynW8axes4SOyaP5qVady0lst01728w8WyP9kiy3ysAa2dLfyxMfkni6ekK26vA4G6iDylGTgmfTAHs6kpaGDhS0GK85pWdC9sjzVlU9-pE3DU4pHYKiiE5X-uryaF3AB1ArXIVbf0UHbo4DOCzr9jlsjz8h0ODjeG7l1qwc3g5ARuhAlYqY932SamTw2HlMAhXhsuBbc-Fpx4TFj_BQiRqx4FnOtY8YNy1IBKZHHtslGURb6BR5CR8Id1RdRDmjL94UBxdQzYZCGuUmZQ6Lmpcqs5kHHdhwLuZYPgTElGlOiMaU1prxwiN9qnlZcIHfQ-WD9plVQZydYSxcF8luyL2dHIvk0DrhMHLJtHasV7DOGVEaxQ3YaT5N1fDlHWlfIHQGLeQ551w5DZMDPParQ5QpkALpFXACkvkUmCCNkgeO3yUAGChMmYmC655WDrz0kJGfCR6N2XL8VQPby7kgx_2FZzBkkzoHoOyS0nn1ni8rd8Zcj-PXyXxXfkvuj48OJnBwkn1-RByhSVWfukI3l2Uq_BpS5TN_Y6PEbLWBsqw |
| linkToPdf | http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwrV1db9MwFLXQJiFeYHyMBQYYCfGWKqkdJ-ZtbC1bGdXEqOib5SQ2VJ2SamuliSd-Ar-RX8K9zgcNTNOEeIkq-TpKb66vz3WOjwl5FVgeW5FBdRLmfZ-nMfO1FKGfw8uOpQZManC948NYHE74aBpNa_4T7oWp9CHaBTccGS5f4wBf5LY7yPGjfgTVHTK0UHczkqIHeHKTiyDBCD_4-FtKSvJagFdC8QVzVJfVc-WdOlPVJnr9smEtXoVH_6ZVrsNdN18N75F5808rmsq8t1qmvezbHyKQ_8cVW-RuDWvpXhWH98ktUzwgWzW5DhrqFPKQZBCX9MhtzaSlpYMzRwUrLmhZ0P2yXJgqIt_Q5rhTihtgqKbHOv35_cesgAtgVrgOkXtHB-0JBXRW0MkXXBh5RCbDwaf9Q78-6MHPIGEIH3JEwkwQ2swwmyc2YBqAEE8sN5Lb0GguA2ZtmEK-SDTPEm5MwrhlWSqhIArYNtkoysLs4BZ0lNvRfRnngLXCUFromAZWRKnIbco8EjfvVGW1CjoexnGm1qohcKZCZyp0pnLOVJceCduei0oJ5AZ9XruwaTvo8zky6eJIfR6_U9NTOX47irgae2TbxVVr2GcMhYwSj-w2gabq7HKBoq5QOQISCzzysm2GvIAfe3RhyhXYAHCLuQRAfY1NJGLUgOPX2UD9CeMlZuC6x1V8rz0klGYyRKd2Ir81QO3ybksx--o0zBmUzZHse0S4wL6xR9Xe6OQUfj35144vyO2Tg6E6Phq_f0ruoEVFzdwlG8vzlXkGEHOZPne54xelJ2tj |
| openUrl | ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=The+Impact+of+Elections+on+Cooperation%3A+Evidence+from+a+Lab-in-the-Field+Experiment+in+Uganda&rft.jtitle=American+journal+of+political+science&rft.au=Grossman%2C+Guy&rft.au=Baldassarri%2C+Delia&rft.date=2012-10-01&rft.issn=0092-5853&rft.volume=56&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=964&rft_id=info:doi/10.1111%2Fj.1540-5907.2012.00596.x&rft_id=info%3Apmid%2F23729913&rft.externalDocID=23729913 |
| thumbnail_l | http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/lc.gif&issn=0092-5853&client=summon |
| thumbnail_m | http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/mc.gif&issn=0092-5853&client=summon |
| thumbnail_s | http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/sc.gif&issn=0092-5853&client=summon |