Sequential reciprocity in two-player, two-stage games: An experimental analysis

We experimentally test Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger's (2004) theory of sequential reciprocity in a sequential prisoner's dilemma and a mini-ultimatum game. Data on behavior and first- and second-order beliefs allow us to classify each subject's behavior as a material best response, a r...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inGames and economic behavior Vol. 70; no. 2; pp. 289 - 303
Main Authors Dhaene, Geert, Bouckaert, Jan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Duluth Elsevier Inc 01.11.2010
Elsevier
Academic Press
SeriesGames and Economic Behavior
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