Sequential reciprocity in two-player, two-stage games: An experimental analysis
We experimentally test Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger's (2004) theory of sequential reciprocity in a sequential prisoner's dilemma and a mini-ultimatum game. Data on behavior and first- and second-order beliefs allow us to classify each subject's behavior as a material best response, a r...
Saved in:
Published in | Games and economic behavior Vol. 70; no. 2; pp. 289 - 303 |
---|---|
Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Duluth
Elsevier Inc
01.11.2010
Elsevier Academic Press |
Series | Games and Economic Behavior |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
Cover
Loading…
Be the first to leave a comment!