Exchange hazards, relational reliability, and contracts in China: The contingent role of legal enforceability

Building on institutional and transaction cost economics, this article proposes that legal enforceability increases the use of contract over relational reliability (e.g., beliefs that the other party acts in a non-opportunistic manner) to safeguard market exchanges characterized by non-trivial hazar...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of international business studies Vol. 41; no. 5; pp. 861 - 881
Main Authors Zhou, Kevin Zheng, Poppo, Laura
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London Palgrave Macmillan 01.06.2010
Palgrave Macmillan UK
SeriesJournal of International Business Studies
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