Exchange hazards, relational reliability, and contracts in China: The contingent role of legal enforceability
Building on institutional and transaction cost economics, this article proposes that legal enforceability increases the use of contract over relational reliability (e.g., beliefs that the other party acts in a non-opportunistic manner) to safeguard market exchanges characterized by non-trivial hazar...
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Published in | Journal of international business studies Vol. 41; no. 5; pp. 861 - 881 |
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Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
London
Palgrave Macmillan
01.06.2010
Palgrave Macmillan UK |
Series | Journal of International Business Studies |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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