Global stability of unique Nash equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly and rent-seeking game

A sufficient condition is derived for the global stability of a unique interior Nash equilibrium in an aggregative game. The condition is applied to investigate the global stability of the Nash–Cournot equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly without product differentiation and that of the Nash equilibrium...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of economic dynamics & control Vol. 32; no. 4; pp. 1204 - 1211
Main Authors Okuguchi, Koji, Yamazaki, Takeshi
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.04.2008
Elsevier
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
SeriesJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Subjects
Aggregate analysis
Cournot oligopoly
Economic stability
Equilibrium
Game theory
Global stability
Globalization
Imperfect competition
Nash equilibrium
Oligopoly
Product differentiation
Rent-seeking
Studies
D43
Cournot oligopoly
Global stability
Rent-seeking
Nash equilibrium
C72
L13
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Summary:A sufficient condition is derived for the global stability of a unique interior Nash equilibrium in an aggregative game. The condition is applied to investigate the global stability of the Nash–Cournot equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly without product differentiation and that of the Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0165-1889
1879-1743
DOI:10.1016/j.jedc.2007.05.003