Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics

• Published in: The American political science review Vol. 94; no. 1; pp. 117 - 129
• Main Author: McCarty, Nolan M.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York, USA Cambridge University Press 01.03.2000; American Political Science Association
• Subjects: Bargaining; Constituents; Cost benefit ratio; Decision making; Election districts; Elections; Executive branch; Executive power; Financial Policy; Fiscal Policy; Government Spending; Legislators; Legislatures; Negotiation; Policy Making; Political parties; Political science; Politics; Powers and duties; Preferences; Presidential powers; Presidential vetoes; Presidents; Separation of Powers; Universalism; Veto; Vetoes; Voting; United States

It is often argued that executive powers such as the veto serve to reduce particularistic spending by the legislature. I argue that the effect of the executive veto depends strongly on assumptions about both the nature of executive preferences and the institutional structure of executive-legislative...